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Note: Administrative Search Warrants
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court held in two
companion cases' that the fourth amendments prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures2 is violated when munici-
palities conduct routine housing and building code inspections
without first obtaining search warrants.3 Since that time, how-
ever, the Court has refused to pursue what the lower courts
and most observers assumed were the full implications of these
decisions,4 ruling instead that in some circumstances, the war-
1. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is made applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Prior to the See and Camara decisions, most state courts and
lower federal courts assumed such inspections did not require warrants.
In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261, 262 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871); In re
Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869); Commonwealth v.
Hadley, 222 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1966), vacated sub nom. Hadley v. Massa-
chusetts, 388 U.S. 464 (1967); St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo.
1960); State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, ai-f'd by an equally
divided court sub nomr. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1958);
Perry v. City of Birmingham, 38 Ala. App. 460, 88 So. 2d 577 (1956); Giv-
ner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956); Richards v. City of Colum-
bia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955). However, in District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the court reversed a conviction
for refusing to permit a health inspector to enter without a warrant,
stating:
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not
protection against self-incrimination; it was the common-law
right of a man to privacy in his home.... To say that a man
suspected of a crime has a right to protection against search
of his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected
of a crime has no such protection is a fantastic absurdity.
178 F.2d at 16-17. The United States Supreme Court affirmed on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
4. Most courts seemed to anticipate that Camara and See would
have across-the-board application to all, or nearly all, administrative
inspections. For example, in the following decisions the courts assumed
the inspections at issue fell under the Camara and See rule, although
they were not simple code enforcement inspections; interestingly
enough, in most of the cases the court found another ground for uphold-
ing the inspection: United States v. Biswel, 442 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir.
1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); United States v. Thriftimart, 429 F.2d
1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S.
1002 (1971) (inspection under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
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rant requirement is inapplicable. 5 Although six cases in the
area of administrative search warrants have now been de-
cided,6 the Court has not yet articulated a workable standard
for determining when a warrant is required. As a result, ad-
ministrators of agencies charged with performing regulatory in-
spections are faced with the Hobson's choice of either forego-
ing the routine use of warrants and thereby risking frequent
challenges to their authority or developing what are destined
Act; consent to inspection held valid); United States v. Kramer, 418
F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Golden, 413 F.2d 1010 (4th
Cir. 1969) (although the premises inspected were open to the public
and no objection was made to the search, the court seems to imply
that in the absence of these circumstances a warrant would have been
required for an inspection by a Treasury agent of premises where fire-
arms were sold); United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1969); United States v. Stan-
ack Sales Co., 387 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Kendall
Co., 324 F. Supp. 628 (D. Mass. 1971); United States v. Undetermined
Quantity of Depressant or Stimulant Drugs, 282 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla.
1968). But see State Real Estate Comm'r v. Roberts, 441 Pa. 159,
271 F.2d 246 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971) (statute author-
izing suspension of broker's license for refusal to permit warrantless
inspections of escrow accounts held constitutional; See not applicable
where individual voluntarily enters a field which requires licensing by
the state); People v. White, 259 Cal. App. 2d 923, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923(App. Dept. Super. Ct. L.A. 1968) (acceptance of state license
to operate a convalescent home constituted implied consent to inspec-
tions required by licensing statute, taking warrantless inspections by
county health department out of See rule). Several courts, recognizing
the special role of liquor regulation in the constitutional scheme, held
See inapplicable to inspections of premises where liquor was sold.
United States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States
v. Sessions, 283 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Pride Club, Inc. v. State,
25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 (1971).
Many law review commentaries also seemed to have assumed that
Camara and See would apply to most other types of administrative in-
spections. See, e.g., Edelman, Search Warrants and Sanitation Require-
ments-The New Look in Enforcement, 45 D-vEi L.J. 296 (1968); Note,
Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment-
Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALB. L. REv. 155 (1967); Note, Camara
and See: A Constitutional Problem With Effect on Air Pollution, 10 Aruz.
L. REv. 120 (1968); Note, Right of the People to Be Secure: The Develop-
ing Role of the Search Warrant, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1119 (1967).
5. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Cater-
ing Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
6. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
Ahneida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), has not been
included in the above list since, although it includes some discussion
of administrative searches, the case involved roving border searches
which are beyond the scope of this Note.
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to be clumsy systems for the issuance of search warrants. The
primary purposes of this Note are, first, to survey the existing
law in order to identify those types of inspections for which
warrants are required and, second, to suggest changes in Min-
nesota law so that it complies with the Court's restrictions on
administrative inspections.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several decades virtually every city in the
United States has- enacted codes prescribing health, safety,
plumbing and sanitation requirements for buildings within its
jurisdiction.7 In addition, the federal, state and local govern-
ments closely regulate certain business activities which could
otherwise defraud or endanger the public. Physical inspections
by representatives of administrative agencies, often in connec-
tion with the issuance of a license to do business, are the pri-
mary means of enforcing these measures. The inspections are
of two general types. A "complaint" inspection occurs when a
third party informs the enforcing agency of a suspected viola-
tion and an inspector is then dispatched to determine whether
the violation in fact exists. Supplementing "complaint" inspec-
tions, which by themselves result in only spotty enforcement,8
are "area" or "periodic" inspections in which every structure in
a particular area or every business covered by a particular law
is inspected over a period of time. Such inspections are usu-
ally undertaken without evidence that a violation exists on the
premises to be inspected. Since many common violations are
not apparent to third parties or even to the occupant of the
premises, area or periodic inspections are usually considered to
be essential to an adequate level of enforcement. 9
7. Many of these codes were enacted in response to the Housing
Act of 1954, which required any city applying for federal urban renewal
assistance to have a "workable program" to eliminate urban blight. Un-
der that provision, the Administrator required that a city have a plan
for code enforcement in order to be eligible. Following several amend-
ments, the statute now provides that no workable program shall be
certified or recertified unless the locality has had an adequate housing
code in effect for six months and is carrying out an effective program
of enforcement. 68 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp.
1973). See Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions
and Remedies, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1254, 1260, n.19 (1966); LaFave, Ad-
ministrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and
See cases, 1967 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Note, Enforcement of Municpal Housing
Codes, 78 Hfnv. L. REv. 801 (1965).
8. See Note, supra. note 7.
9. See generally Gribetz and Grad, supra note 7; Note, supra
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The penalties for noncompliance are similar for both the
municipal codes and the measures regulating specific business
activities. Generally, a violation constitutes a misdemeanor;
however, many of the ordinances and statutes also provide
that no one may be convicted unless he has first failed to cor-
rect the violation within a reasonable time after the issuance
of an official order instructing him to do so."° In addition,
the enforcing agency is usually authorized to invoke adminis-
trative remedies, so that licenses or permits may be revoked or
buildings tagged before prosecution is sought. Purely civil pen-
alties are prescribed in relatively few instances, although it has
been suggested that in many circumstances these may be pref-
erable from the point of view of the enforcing agency.1
Throughout this Note inspections will be frequently de-
scribed as either "routine" or "nonroutine." The term 'Jr Qu
tine" will be used to refer to area and periodic inspections as
weff as all other systematic inspections not instigated by a
complaint or tip, such as licensing inspections in the regular
course of issuance. In addition, a distinction will be made be-
tween measures regulating the physical condition and charac-
note 7; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 n.12 (1967).
10. For example, the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances provides:
67.040 Service of Notices. Whenever the . . .Director of In-
spections determines that there has been a violation, or that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a
violation, of any provision of this Code he shall give notice
of such violation . . . to the person ... responsible therefor.
Such notice shall:
a) Be in writing;
c) Specify the violation which exists and remedial action re-
quired;
d) Allow a reasonable time for the performance of any act it
requires;
e) Be served upon the owner...
f) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, a notice
of violation shall not be required for violations of Sections
.... (listed are several sections, not including those cover-
ing most typical code violations).
MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 67.040 (1971) (emphasis added).
See also DuLUTH LEGis. CODE § 29A-4(1) (Supp. 1966); ST. PAUL
LEGIS. CODE § 54.18 (d) (1965).
11. Gribetz and Grad, supra note 7, at 1275-81. The basic disad-
vantage of criminal sanctions is that they do not result in either repairs
of sub-standard buildings or deterrence of other owners, since they are
directed at the culpability of the defendant rather than the condition
of the building. In addition, personal jurisdiction, service and appear-
ance are required, adjournments and delays are frequent, and courts
are reluctant to treat code violators as criminals and so rarely impose
strict penalties. Id.
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teristics of buildings and those regulating specific business ac-
tivities since, although it has not been so stated by the Court,
the classification of a provision as one or the other may some-
times determine whether its enforcement inspections require a
warrant.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH
A. THE Supwz4E COURT CASES
The Supreme Court's first attempt to define the restric-
tions applicable to administrative searches emphasized the
"civil" nature of an administrative search as opposed to that of
a traditional criminal search. In the 1959 decision of Frank v.
Maryland'2 a Baltimore Health Department official, acting
on the complaint of a neighbor, inspected several houses on
appellant's block in order to find the source of a rat infesta-
tion.'3 Appellant, however, refused to permit an inspection
of his premises and was convicted of a violation of the munic-
ipal code which permitted warrantless entry by officials based
on "cause to suspect a nuisance exists." A five-man majority
of the Supreme Court found the code provision valid and held
that appellant's conviction for refusing to allow entry did not
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court reasoned that since the constitutional warrant re-
quirement was directed primarily toward searches for evidence
to be used in criminal prosecutions, 14 the inspection touched
12. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
13. The area outside the appellant's house was filled with one-
half ton of straw, trash and rodent feces. Id. at 361.
14. Much of the controversy which has been engendered by the
application of the fourth amendment's protections to routine administra-
tive inspections has involved two closely-related issues: 1) whether the
relationship between the fourth and the fifth amendments is such that
the fourth amendment's requirement of a warrant applies only to
searches for evidence to be used in a criminal proceeding; and 2)
whether the two clauses of the fourth amendment are interdependent
so that possession of a valid warrant is a prerequisite to a reasonable
search except'in a few narrowly defined situations.
1) Proponents of the view that the fourth amendment is to be read
in pari materia with the fifth amendment and thus be applied only
in criminal cases, rely principally on the English case of Entick v. Car-
rington, 19 Howell's State Trials, coL 1029 (Ct. C.P. 1765) (reported
more briefly at 95 Eng. Rep. 807), a criminal case usually considered
to be the predecessor of the fourth amendment. In that case Lord Cam-
den declared void the writs of assistance and general warrants used
to conduct searches on the mere suspicion of illegal activity. In Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court held that the fourth
amendment was violated by an order compelling production of documents
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"at most upon the periphery of the important interests safe-
guarded by the Fourth Amendment's protection against offi-
cial intrusion."'15 The opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
emphasized the indispensable importance of health inspections,
the insubstantiality of the intrusion on individual privacy and
the burden a search warrant requirement would impose on
agencies charged with carrying out inspection programs. Un-
der the Frank view, then, only inspections to uncover evidence
for use in criminal prosecutions would require a warrant.
Eight years later the Court overruled Frank in two cases
which, unlike Frank, involved area inspections for municipal
code violations. In Camara v. Municipal Court'0 appellant,
lessee of the ground floor of an apartment building, twice re-
fused to allow a housing inspector access to a part of the
leased premises without a search warrant. Appellant's land-
lord had informed the inspector during an annual area inspec-
tion that the rear portion of the leasehold was being used for
residential purposes contrary to the building's occupancy permit.
Appellant was arrested and convicted for refusing to permit in-
spection in violation of the San Francisco Housing Code. Re-
versing a decision of the California Supreme Court, the Court
held that an administrative inspection such as that in Camara
violates the fourth amendment when conducted without a
search warrant. The Court rejected the civil-criminal distinc-
tion postulated in Frank, recognizing that a fourth amend-
where the severe penalties imposed by the customs laws approximated
criminal penalties. However, the Court usually speaks of the fourth
amendment interest as being based on privacy rather than self-
protection. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967). Cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), in which the Court
recognized both self-protection and protection of privacy to be within
the fourth amendment. Id. at 365.
2) The current view of the Court is that the clauses of the fourth
r amendment should be read interdependently. See Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1938). These cases view the warrant re-
quirement as an independent constitutional requirement, so that ex-
cept in a few carefully defined types of cases, a search of private prop-
erty is unreasonable if not authorized by a valid search warrant. How-
ever, the "narrowly-defined" exceptions often seem to swallow the rule.
A more complete discussion of these issues may be found in Note,
The Right of the People to Be Secure: The Developing Role of the
Search Warrant, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1119 (1967) and Note, The Law of
Administrative Inspections: Are Camara and See Still Alive and Well?,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 313.
15. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1967).
16. 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
[Vol. 58:607
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ment right of privacy could be jeopardized even where no crim-
inal prosecution was involved:
[We cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at
stake in these cases are merely "peripheral". It is surely anom-
alous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the indi-
vidual is suspected of criminal behavior.1 7
The opinion further noted that "even accepting Frank's
rather remarkable premise," regulatory codes providing for in-
spection are usually enforced by criminal process.1 8  How-
ever, the Court refused to accept appellant's view that the tra-
ditional probable cause standard should apply to code inspec-
tion programs, making it necessary to show probable cause to
believe that a violation existed on the particular premises to be
inspected.' Instead, the need to search, would be balanced
against the invasion entailed by the search and sufficient cause
would be deemed to exist if reasonable administrative stand-
ards for conducting an area inspection were satisfied with re-
gard to a particular dwelling.2 0 The Court suggested, but did
not seem to require, that normally a warrant should be sought
in the case of an area inspection only after the citizen re-
fused to permit a warrantless inspection:
[M]ost citizens allow inspections of their property without
a warrant Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the
Fourth Amendments requirement that a warrant specify the
property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should
normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has
been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason
for securing immediate entry.21
17. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). See
the language used in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-
17, supra. note 3.
18. 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
19. Id. at 534.
20. Id. at 538.
21. Id. at 539-40. The dissent in Camara seemed to think that
the majority was imposing a requirement of a prior refusal of consent
before a warrant based on the lesser probable cause standard could
be issued for the inspection of a home. An indication that prior refusal
of consent might have been intended as a constitutional requirement
for inspection of homes is found in See v. Seattle, in which the Court
said in a footnote:
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises
may be issued only after access is refused; since surprise may
often be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business es-
tablishments, the reasonableness of warrants issued in advance
of inspection will necessarily vary with the nature of the regu-
lation involved and may differ from standards applicable to pri-
vate homes.
387 U.S. 541, 545, n.6 (1967) (emphasis added). Arguably, the Court's
position was that a warrant based on the lesser probable cause standard
19741
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See v. Seattle22 extended the Camara holding to area
inspections of business premises. The Court there held that
the owner of a locked commercial warehouse could not be
prosecuted for refusing to allow a warrantless fire inspection
of the interior of the building. Again, a flexible probable
cause standard was approved:
The agency's particular demand for access will of course be
measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against
a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account
the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regu-
lation involved.28
However, the Court specifically cautioned that it was not im-
plying that business premises might not reasonably be in-
spected in many more situations than private homes nor ques-
tioning "such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing pro-
grams which require inspections prior to operating a business
or marketing a product. ' 24
See and Camara thus expressly rejected two major prem-
ises of the Frank opinion: that a warrantless search may meet
the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness if it is
"civil" rather than "criminal" and that administrative inspec-
tions are "civil" searches. However, in distinguishing regula-
tory techniques such as licensing inspections from area inspec-
tions for code violations, the Court left the way open for the
adoption of at least a narrow exception to the See rule.
The first inroad into the See rule occurred in 1970 in
Colonnade v. United States25 which involved a nonroutine
inspection for a violation of the federal excise tax law. The in-
spection was initiated by a member of the Internal Revenue
may sometimes be issued for inspection of business premises without
prior refusal of consent, but ordinarily could not be for the inspection
of homes. If this view is correct, any threat to the individual privacy
of a householder occasioned by the relaxed standard of probable cause
is greatly lessened.
22. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
23. Id. at 545.
24. Id. at 546. Mr. Justice Clark, writing in dissent for four mem-
bers of the Court, predicted that the Camara and See decisions would
degrade the fourth amendment by resulting in "boxcar" or "paper" war-
rants, issued as a matter of course, with probable cause based on area
inspection standards. He disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
few occupants would refuse entry to inspect. The dissenters, apparently
reading the "reasonableness" clause of the fourth amendment independ-
ently from the warrant clause, could see nothing unreasonable about
inspections under "the carefully circumscribed requirements of health
and safety codes." 387 U.S. 541, 548. See note 14 supra.
25. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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Service's alcohol and tobacco tax division who, while a guest
at a party at a catering establishment, had noticed a possible
violation. When federal agents later visited the establishment,
they were not permitted to enter the locked liquor storeroom.
The agents broke the lock and entered, removing bottles sus-
pected of being refilled in violation of federal law. Reasoning
that the See rationale did not apply to an inspection of a li-
censed retail liquor dealer, the Court concluded that a warrant
was not required before such an inspection. However, as the
revenue statute specifically provided for the imposition of a
fine for refusal to permit entry and did not authorize a forcible
entry, the Court held that a fine was the exclusive sanction
for such refusal. The evidence gained by the forcible entry
was therefore suppressed. The dissent agreed with the major-
ity's conclusion that no warrant was required but argued that
the statute did permit a forcible entry. Perhaps because Mr.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, emphasized the special
treatment traditionally accorded to the liquor industry or be-
cause the evidence was in fact suppressed, Colonnade was not
immediately seized on by the lower courts or commentators as
evidence that the See warrant requirement was undergoing re-
finement.
The next year, however, Wyman v. James2 indicated un-
mistakably that some members of the Court were uneasy with
the implications of See and Camara and were willing to hold
the cases to their facts. By the time Wyman was decided, both
the membership and the perspective of the Court had changed
drastically; with the exception of Mr. Justice White, who con-
curred in Wyman,2 7 the members of the Camara majority who
still remained on the Court composed the Wyman dissent.2 8 The
Court held in Wyman that a warrantless visit to the home of a
welfare recipient, carried out under the carefully restricted pro-
visions of New York law, 29 did not constitute a "search" within
26. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman has been the subject of much
critical commentary. See, e.g., 51 B.UJL. REv. 486 (1971); 48 DENVER
L.J. 87 (1971); 85 HARv L. Rrv. 258 (1971); 69 MrcH. L. REV. 1259 (1971);
66 Nw. UL. REV. 714 (1971); 17 N.Y.L.F. 856 (1971); 24 VAiD. L. REV.
821 (1971).
27. Mr. Justice White, the author of the majority opinions in Ca-
mara and See, concurred in the judgment and joined with the majority
opinion except for the portion which held the welfare visit not to be
a search within the fourth amendment.
28. Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan, the other members of
the Camara majority still on the Court, dissented in Wyman.
29. Mrs. James received written notice several days in advance of
1974]
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the fourth amendment meaning of the term and that, even if it
did possess some of the characteristics of a traditional search, it
still met the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness. "
The particular visit at issue was a routine one, not based on a
complaint or a suspicion of fraud. The majority opinion by
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated that although the visit was per-
haps investigative as well as rehabilitative, it nevertheless
could not be equated with a search in the criminal law context.
The Court distinguished Camnara and See by noting that in
both cases searches for criminal violations were involved,
whereas in Wyman no criminal sanctions could be imposed; if
the beneficiary's consent to the visit was not granted, aid would
simply be denied. The Court thus partially reinstated the
civil-criminal distinction of Frank without overruling Camara
by redefining "criminal" to encompass the facts of both the
Frank and Camara cases.31
Wyman can be explained as merely creating a new excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for the inspection of a wel-
fare home, an exception similar to that which was arguably
created for the inspection of a liquor retailer in Colonnade.
There are, however, two more likely interpretations of the de-
cision. First, the opinion may be viewed as removing the war-
the visit, and the date of the visit was specified. In addition, section
134 (a) of the New York Social Services Law provided:
In accordance with regulations of the department, any investi-
gation or reinvestigation of eligibility . . . shall be limited to
those factors reasonably necessary to insure that expenditures
shall be in accord with applicable provisions of this chapter
and the rules of the board and regulations of the department
and shall be conducted in such manner so as not to violate
any civil right of the applicant or recipient. In making such
investigation or reinvestigation, sources of information, other
than public records, shall be consulted only with the permission
of the applicant or recipient. However, if such permission is
not granted by the applicant or recipient, the appropriate public
welfare official may deny, suspend or discontinue public assist-
ance or care until such time as he may be satisfied that such
applicant or recipient is eligible therefor.
52A N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw § 134(a) (McKinney 1967), as amended, 52A
N.Y. Soc. Smav. LAw § 134(a) (McKinney 1973).
30. The Wyman opinion listed 11 factors which the Court be-
lieved indicated that the visit, even if a search, was not unreasonable,
relying heavily on the "gentle means" by which the visit was under-
taken and the state's interests in preventing misuse of public funds and
protecting the dependent child from abuse. 400 U.S. 309, 318-24 (1971).
31. 400 U.S. 309, 325 (1971). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring), where a distinction is described between area
searches which are essentially administrative and those which are "fish-
ing expeditions" for evidence to support prosecutions.
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rant requirement almost entirely in any case where no crimi-
nal sanctions are threatened for either a discovered violation
or a refusal to permit entry. A search in such circumstances
need only be reasonable. Second, the Court may be proceed-
ing on a notion, akin to "impli"L consent,"32 that beneficiaries
of government programs must be prepared to fulfill reasonable
conditions attached to their participation.33
In spite of the apparent dissatisfaction with Camara and
See shown in Wyman and perhaps in Colonnade, it still seemed
likely that the Colonnade rule would be restricted to liquor
control and similar types of inspections, since both Wyman
and Colonnade involved considerations which were at least in
part quite different from those at issue in ordinary adminis-
trative inspectiqns. United States v. Biswel,3 4 the latest de-
cision of the Court, made it clear, however, that the permissi-
ble scope of warrantless administrative searches would be ex-
panded. In Biswell the Court held that a warrantless search
of a locked firearms storeroom during business hours, author-
ized by the Gun Control Act of 1968,31 did not violate the
fourth amendment.3 6 The Court determined that neither con-
sent nor a warrant was necessary for such a search to be law-
ful:
Respondenfs submission to lawfu authority and his decision
to step aside and permit the inspection rather than face a crim-
inal prosecution is analogous to a householder's acquiescence
32. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
33. This is how Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, interpreted the
majority opinion. 400 U.S. 309, 326-28 (1971). If this interpretation
is correct, the opinion may signal a nascent revival of the right-privilege
distinction. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963). This
view is supported by a passage in the Court's opinion in which it com-
pares the denial of welfare benefits based on a refusal to permit an
inspection to a taxpayer's refusal to produce for review by an Internal
Revenue Service agent proof of a deduction:
[T]he taxpayer is fully within his "rights" in refusing to pro-
duce the proof but in maintaining and asserting those rights
a tax detriment results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer's
own making. So here Mrs. James has the "right" to refuse
the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of
aid, similar to the taxpayer's resultant additional tax, flows
from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of
constitutional magnitude is involved.
400 U.S. 302, 324 (1971).
34. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1971).
36. The opinion reversed a decision of the Tenth Circuit holding
that § 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 was unconstitutional be-
cause it authorized warrantless inspections, and that consent given to
the inspection was invalid. 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971).
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in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a
possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible
entry.... In the context of a regulatory inspection system
of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and
scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but
on the authority of a valid statute.3 7
In justifying the creation of yet another exception to the war-
rant requirement, the Court emphasized the public interest in
close scrutiny of interstate traffic in firearms and the crucial
role that inspection plays in the regulatory scheme. Frequent
and unannounced firearms inspections were necessary for ef-
fective enforcement, and the requirement of a warrant there-
fore might have frustrated the purpose of the search in Bis-
well. Thus the Court distinguished the fire inspection in See,
where the conditions involved were by their nature difficult to
conceal or correct in the short time needed to procure a war-
rant.3 8 The Court also found that the Biswell search imposed
only a limited intrusion on the dealer's justifiable expectations
of privacy since he had chosen to engage in a pervasively regu-
lated business and to accept a federal license.3 0 Furthermore,
firearms dealers are annually informed of both the purposes
of the inspections and the limits of the inspectors' authority,
so that a warrant would not be needed to provide this infor-
mation. Despite the Court's emphasis upon the exigencies of
firearms control, however, its holding was clearly not intended
to be limited to firearms inspections:
[W]here, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal
interests and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy
are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed
without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute.40
B. ANALYSIS OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Although the Court's opinion in Camara amounted to an al-
most total repudiation of both the premises and conclusions set
forth in Frank, each case seemed to offer to administrators of
agencies responsible for performing inspections some guidance
as to how to proceed. The subsequent cases, however, demon-
strated that the Court would no longer be satisfied with all-
inclusive answers, preferring instead to move more slowly and
37. 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
38. The Court also argued that if a warrant were required but the
procedures for its procurement were permitted to be sufficiently flexible
to meet the above objection, the warrant would provide little protection.
39. Cf. note 33 supra.
40. 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
[Vol. 58:607
SEARCH WARRANTS
define what is required in one area at a time.4' While this ap-
41. The Court has purported to use a balancing test throughout
this series of cases, setting off the public interest in regulation against
the individual's interest in privacy. See Greenberg, The Balance of In-
terests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of
Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALnF. L. REv. 1011
(1973). Among the factors considered by the Court in the balancing
process are:
1) The history of acceptance of warrantless seraches. This factor was
relied on by the Frank, Biswell and Colonnade majorities and the Ca-
mara dissent. 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959); 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972); 397
U.S. 72, 76 (1970); 387 U.S. 541, 548 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
However, this factor alone is not persuasive, since administrative regu-
lation today has expanded far beyond what it was even several decades
ago.
2) The significance of the public interest in regulation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972); Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971); Colonnade v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 550-51 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting). The difficulty with this
factor taken alone is that a strong case can be made for finding an
overwhelming public interest in virtually every area that is currently
regulated. Certainly, there is as great a public interest in deterring
crime as in enforcing housing codes.
3) The extent to which the warrant requirement would frustrate the
purpose of the search. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972). This depends partly on what the requirements for issuance
of a warrant are. A warrant requirement that embodies a relaxed
standard of probable cause may not frustrate the statutory purpose
while a warrant that could be issued only on a showing of traditional
probable cause might. The question to be asked is whether other means
to satisfy the public interest which are not violative of individual pri-
vacy are available. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.
1969).
4) The substantiality of the intrusion on a justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). For ex-
ample, a typical criminal search in which papers and personal belong-
ings are closely examined often involves more of an intrusion on
personal dignity and privacy than an area inspection for violations of
the plumbing code, and a person engaging in unregulated or loosely-
regulated commercial activities has a greater expectation of privacy
than a person canning food or selling firearms. Another related consid-
eration is the amount of protection a warrant would provide to individ-
ual privacy while still permitting effective regulation. United States
v. Biswell, supra, at 316. For instance, there may be little protection
to be gained by imposing a warrant requirement if a weakened probable
cause standard would apply; surprise would be absolutely necessary in
all cases; any information the warrant would provide to the occupants
of the premises is already in his possession; and the circumstances under
which inspection might take place are clearly defined in a statute. Of
course, the phrase "justifiable expectation of privacy" should not be
interpreted to mean that citizens need only be sufficiently warned that
warrantless searches will take place to avoid a warrant requirement.
See also United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969),
in which Judge Wisdom stated that to decide whether to enforce an
Internal Revenue Service summons he was required to apply the analy-
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proach undeniably produces confusion for administrative agen-
cies, it may avoid a series of later overrulings. In spite of the
present case-by-case approach, at least two generalizations can
be drawn from the Court's opinions. First, more stringent
safeguards of the citizen's privacy will be required where a
municipal code inspection is involved than where a specific
business activity is being regulated.42  Second, a different
standard will apply to "civil" as opposed to "criminal" searches;
the citizen's privacy interest is given less weight where crim-
inal prosecution is not anticipated. 43 At the same time, however,
each of these generalizations may pose more questions than it
answers.
Initially, it may be nearly impossible for an enforcing
agency to determine with any precision whether it must se-
cure a warrant prior to inspection, since See and Biswell are not
easily distinguishable at a constitutional level. Given that the
object of municipal housing and building code provisions is not
in most instances compliance, however, a possible distinction may
be drawn. In inspections under municipal building, health, safety
and fire codes, if a delay to obtain a search warrant results in cor-
rection of a dangerous condition prior to the inspection, nothing is
lost; in contrast, if such a delay allows a firearms dealer to
dispose of a cache of illegal weapons, the statutory purpose is
subverted. However, even this distinction is not always pres-
ent. The distinction is blurred where, for example, building
code provisions regarding maximum occupancy or placement of
stored goods might easily be avoided by a temporary correc-
tion of the violation if advance notice of an inspection is given.
The distinction is erased where in the Biswell situation the
delay to obtain a search warrant can be avoided; after all, there
was no suggestion in See that obtaining a search war-
rant must normally be delayed until the occupant has first
refused to consent to an inspection.44  Presumably, if a war-
sis of interests developed in Camara to the fact situation. The analysis
used by Judge Wisdom requires a consideration of factors which are
similar to those set forth above. The court in Youghiogheny & Ohio
Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973), considered a simi-
lar set of factors.
42. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); See v. Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967). It is clear that the Biswell rationale for war-
rantless searches is applicable only to inspections of business prem-
ises, and cannot be used to justify inspections of homes or cars. Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
44. See note 21 supra.
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rant were to be required in the Biswefl situation, the lesser
probable cause standard articulated in See and Camara would
apply so that obtaining a warrant would impose no insur-
mountable burden on the regulating agency. Thus, if an oc-
cupant need not be warned and a warrant is readily obtain-
able, the requirement of a warrant should no more frustrate
the purpose of the search in Biswell than in See. On the other
hand, as pointed out by the Court in Biswell,45 there may be
some differences in the extent of the protection of an individ-
ual's interest in privacy that a warrant would provide in the
two situations. The operator of a store selling firearms is
likely to be well-versed in the intricacies of the regulatory
laws and the limits of the inspector's authority; a warrant
would add little to his knowledge of his rights. In contrast,
the warehouse owner in a case such as See cannot be expected
to have much familiarity with the powers of inspectors under
the municipal code, and a warrant delineating the limits of such
powers might prove useful. The regulatory provisions in cases
such as Biswell and Colonnade also tend to be more narrowly
drawn than municipal codes, so that an abuse of authority
is less likely. Although these differences might not seem suf-
ficient to justify the Court's application of the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement in one case and not in the other,
the Court has not indicated that Biswell was intended to un-
dercut See's application to municipal code inspections.
Moreover, the Court's reliance on the presence or absence
of criminal sanctions in evaluating the strength of a citizen's
privacy interest has perhaps been misplaced, inasmuch as the
distinction between criminal and civil sanctions is not always
an accurate measure of the potential intrusiveness of the
search. Some searches are intrinsically more objectionable
than others: an armed, uniformed policeman who forcibly en-
ters a home in the middle of the night and searches through
the occupant's most personal papers and effects, perhaps even
doing some physical damage to his property, presents a much
greater threat to the fourth amendment privacy interest than
does an unarmed inspector who at reasonable regular inter-
vals appears at a place of business during daylight hours and re-
quests admittance to the storeroom. Although the severity of
the sanction might correlate with the intrusiveness of the search
over a large number of cases, there is no reason to assume that
45. 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
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this will be so in any particular case. A result more attuned to
the extent of the violation of privacy involved would be reached
if the object and scope of the search, rather than just the poten-
tial sanction, were emphasized in deciding which warrantless
searches are permissible.
The remainder of this Note will be divided into two parts.
First, the constitutional warrant requirement will be dis-
cussed, focusing on the circumstances under which a warrant
will ordinarily be required, the exceptions to the requirement
of a warrant and the probable cause showing needed to obtain
a warrant for an administrative inspection. Next, the Minne-
sota law of administrative search warrants will be reviewed,
and changes in the present law suggested.
III. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. WHEN A WARRANT IS REQUIRED
Since the Supreme Court has not yet provided an ade-
quate standard for determining when warrants are required,
any attempt to derive guidelines for application of the war-
rant requirement must be largely speculative. In particular, it
is difficult to determine, first, under what circumstances a reg-
ulatory inspection of commercial premises falls under the rule
of Biswell rather than See; and, second, whether a warrant
will be required when the sanction threatened is more than
the withholding of a government benefit as in Wyman but is
still purely civil. Nevertheless, by applying the above decisions
and those of the lower courts, it is possible to identify tenta-
tively the situations in which warrants are required:
1. Commercial premises-possible criminal sanction
As noted earlier, enforcing agencies have had difficulty in
deciding whether to follow See or Biswell in a particular in-
spection. 46 At least until the Court speaks again, they are left
with the following principles. Where an industry or business is
subject to pervasive governmental regulation, and where unan-
nounced and frequent inspections are necessary, warrantless
inspections are valid under Biswell if authorized by a nar-
rowly-drawn statute that is sufficiently limited in time, place
and scope.47 On the other hand, where a statute is aimed at
46. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
47. Many of the Minnesota regulatory statutes which authorize
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the physical condition and characteristics of a building rather
than at a particular business activity, and where frequent sur-
prise inspections are not necessary to ensure compliance with
the statute, a warrant is required under See.4" The more dif-
ficult determinations lie in the middle ground, either where reg-
ulation is aimed at a particular business, but the business is
not one subject to the type of total regulation found in Bis-
well, or where there is a specific activity which is highly regu-
warrantless inspections apply to businesses which are pervasively reg-
ulated; unless the Biswell and Colonnade rationale is limited to statutes
concerning firearms and liquor, they are likely to be sustained if prop-
erly drawn. Although Biswefl specifically refers to important federal
interests, it is unlikely that the federal government would be permitted
a greater intrusion on privacy than would state governments. At a
minimum, warrantless inspections pursuant to laws regulating food and
drugs should be permissible. However, the Minnesota statutes are gen-
erally not drawn with the narrow particularity that Bisuwell requires.
For example, MmN. STAT. § 31.04 (1971) is a comprehensive provision
allowing the Commissioner of Agriculture access to any place where
any article of food which is regulated by state law is kept:
[Tihe Commissioner . . . shall have access to all places
where any article of food, or other article, the manufacture,
sale, use or transportation of which is now or hereafter re-
stricted, regulated or prohibited ... is or may be manufactured,
prepared, stored, sold, used, transported . . . or had in posses-
sion with intent to use, sell or transport . . . and may take
samples.... Any person obstructing such an entry or inspec-
tion, or failing upon request to assist therein shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor.
The chapter includes a cryptic search warrant provision, which appears
to apply only to seizures of food and not to the inspections themselves:
The Commissioner may seize all food, the manufacture, trans-
portation, sale or use of which is now or hereafter prohibited
by law. . . and for this purpose he. . . shall have the powers
of a constable. Such seizure may be made without a warrant,
but in such case, as soon as practicable, he shall cause the per-
son suspected of such violation of law to be arrested and prose-
cuted therefor. When necessary, a search warrant may be is-
sued, as in the case of stolen property, the form of the com-
plaint and of the warrant being adapted to the purposes of this
section.
MINN. STAT. § 31.05 (1971). See also MiNN. STAT. § 31.08 (1971), which
allows the Commissioner access to any vehicle in which food is being
transported within the state.
Other statutes provide specifically for inspections related to certain
food products. So regulated are egg dealers, 1DNN. STAT. § 29.27
(1971); filled dairy products, Mnnw. STAT. § 32.532 (1971); horsemeat,
Mnw. STAT. § 31.631(3) (1971); and meat products, MINN. STAT. §
31A.25 (1971). Certain places where foods are held or processed are
statutorily controlled. Examples include cold storage warehouses,
M.mN. STAT. § 28.05 (1971); canneries, MAnm. STAT. § 31.31 (1971); and
slaughterhouses, Mnw. STAT. § 31.53 (1971). Most of these statutes pro-
vide for licensing but also include criminal penalties for violation.
48. Examples of Minnesota laws falling into this category are those
authorizing building and fire inspections. See note 10 supra.
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lated in many different and otherwise unregulated busi-
nesses.
49
A very expansive view of Biswell and a correlative narrow
view of See was taken by a federal district court in United
States v. Montrom,50 a case involving a narcotics law viola-
tion:
* . . See extended the rationale of Camara to private non-dwell-
ing premises used for otherwise unregulated purposes....
* . .Biswell makes it clear that the principles of Colonnade Ca-
tering are applicable to all professions in which there is a legi-
timate public interest in close regulation, as long as the statute
authorizing inspection defines with fair specificity the allowable
time, place and scope of such an inspection. 51
Biswell was read even more broadly in Youghiogheny and Ohio
Coal Co. v. Morton,5 2 a case under the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969,53 where the court stated that
"an exception to the warrants requirement is now established
where statutory regulation of businesses, pursuant to the gov-
ernment's police power, mandates warrantless entry."5 14 The
court went on to note that in the fourth amendment area the
congressional determination was entitled to great weight, and
as there was some basis for Congress' approach, the court
would not second-guess its determination. Although a qualify-
ing footnote stated that the court's view might be different if
the search was not in a business context of an inherently dan-
gerous type,5 5 the narrow scope of review suggested by the
49. An example of this type of regulation is a statute controlling
pollution. Although aimed at a certain activity, i.e., the emission of
air and water pollutants, the standards apply across the board to many
different kinds of commercial establishments. MINN. STAT. § 115.04(3)
(Supp. I, 1973) provides:
Access to premises: Whenever it shall be necessary for the pur-
poses of chapter 115 and . . . chapter 116, the agency, or any
member . . . upon presentation of credentials, may enter upon
any property, public or private for the purpose of obtaining
information or examination of records or conducting surveys or
investigations.
At least one court has held that air pollution inspections undertaken
without warrant, notice or consent violate the fourth amendment. West-
ern Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907 (Col. Ct.
App. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1973)
(No. 690).
50. 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
51. Id. at 1339.
52. 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
53. 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
54. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45,
49 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
55. Id. at 52 n.7.
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court is notable.56 If this interpretation of Biswell is accu-
rate, it is possible that See will eventually apply only to muni-
cipal building, health, safety and fire code inspections. How-
ever, it is also possible that finer distinctions, such as that sug-
gested earlier between routine and nonroutine inspections, will
in time be adopted for cases that do not fall dearly under
either See or Biswell. The lower courts to date have applied
Biswell to inspections for violations of laws regulating food,
drugs, motor vehicle inspection stations and mining opera-
tions. 57
In those situations in which a warrant is not required, at
least two restrictions remain: a warrantless inspection sys-
tem which includes criminal penalties must be "carefully lir-'
ited in time, place and scope," 58-and the inspection itself must
comply with the authorizing statute and be reasonable. The
first restriction results in few problems. Although Biswell did
not provide any criteria for assessing the validity of an inspec-
tion system, the Gun Control Act of 196859 authorized entry
into the premises of any firearms dealer only during business
hours and for the purpose of inspecting any records or docu-
ments kept under the Act and any firearms or ammunition
56. This deference to Congress was also suggested by the dissent
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 293 (1973) (White,
J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F.
Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg.
Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972); United States v. Montrom, 345
F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem., 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973);
People v. Terraciano, 39 App. Div. 2d 1005, 333 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1972).
The habeas corpus petition of the defendant in the latter case was
granted in Terraciano v. Montagne, 360 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
Cf. United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333 (D.D.C. 1973), which found
that no warrant was required for an inspection, but that under the pro-
visions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act the only remedy
for refusal of entry was to seek prosecution for the refusal. In Del
Campo, the court stated that the Biswell Court distinguished See, which
"apparently holds that some administrative inspections are still subject
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements if the conditions to
be inspected are such that they could not be remedied in a short period
of time"; the court found this time limitation to be "nebulous" but held
that it was in any event irrelevant in the instant case because unan-
nounced inspections were essential 345 F. Supp. 1371 n.12. Although
this is not an adequate interpretation of the distinction between Biswell
and See, it points up the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate
the distinction so that it could be understood by the lower courts.
58. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). See also
United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (1972), aff'd mem., 480
F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1970).
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kept on the premises. Presumably, then, a statute which both
limits warrantless inspections to business hours and premises
and defines carefully what can be inspected is valid.0°
The difficulty in complying with the second restriction lies
in determining what has in fact been authorized by the statute. It
has been argued that even where a warrantless inspection is
authorized by a valid statute the inspector is not authorized to
to enter the premises without the consent of the occupant if
the statute provides a specific sanction for refusal of entry.
Rather, the inspecting agency is limited to charging the occu-
pant with a violation of the entry refusal provision of the
statute. This argument, set forth in United States v. Lit-
vin,6' is based on the difference in the statutes at issue in the
Biswell and Colonnade cases. In Colonnade a specific sanction
(equal to the sanction for any other violation) was provided
in the statute for refusal of entry to an inspector.0 2  In Bis-
well, on the other hand, there was only a general penalty clause
which might not have been applicable in the case of a refusal
of entry.6 3  From this statutory difference the Litvin court
concluded that a forcible, that is, a nonconsensual, entry is
permissible where no specific remedy for entry refusal is in
the statute but not where such an alternative is expressly
provided.
This conclusion is certainly a plausible explanation for
the different results in the two cases6 4 because it must be
60. A statute permitting "access at all times" was held in Terra-
ciano v. Montayne, 360 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), to be insuffi-
ciently limited to permit warrantless inspection, the court stating that
the inspection would have otherwise been permissible. However the
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, under which warrantless inspec-
tions have been permitted (see note 57 supra) permits inspections
"within reasonable limits" and "at reasonable times"-hardly helpful
limitations. 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1970).
61. 353 F. Supp. 1333 (D.D.C. 1973).
62. The statute at issue in Colonnade provides:
Any owner of any building, or place, or person having the
agency or superintendence of the same, who refuses to admit
any officer or employee of the Treasury Department acting un-
der the authority of section 7606 or refuses to permit him to ex-
amine such article or articles, shall, for every refusal, forfeit$500.
26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1970).
63. The general penalty statute in Biswell provides sanctions up
to 10 years imprisonment and $10,000 in fines for violations of the Gun
Control Act. However, a penalty for refusing entry to inspectors is
not listed. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1970).
64. A non-consensual entry was allowed in Biswell, but not in
Colonnade, though a warrantless search was held to be valid in both
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presumed that by giving government agents a means of en-
forcing the right of entry Congress intended to authorize en-
try. However, it relies on what may be an accidental dif-
ference between the statutes. In addition, if this distinction
was in fact determinative in Bisweli, it is likely that the Court
would have stated so expressly. Another possible explanation
for the different outcomes in Biswell and Colonnade is that the
Court was distinguishing between an entry made over the
protest of an occupant, either by physical force or otherwise,,
and one based simply on what would be inadequate consent if
a warrant were otherwise required for the search. This dis-
tinction is never made in the criminal context; there, a submis-
sion to a show of authority is insufficient to validate a war-
rantless search. In the present context, however, an otherwise
inadequate consent is being used to justify only a forcible
entry and not a warrantless search. Thus, although Congress
might not have authorized a forcible entry, it is arguable that
stepping aside in submission to lawful authority is all that is
required to render an entry legal.
2. Commercial premises-no criminal sanction
Since no warrant is required for an inspection authorized
by a valid statute in an area of pervasive government regula-
tion even if a criminal penalty is provided, no warrant is re-
quired if the only available sanction is civil. For example,
where a particular business activity is highly regulated and the
only sanction is revocation of a license, no warrant should be
required if the statute is sufficiently narrow. Where the busi-
ness is not one subject to such regulation, it is not clear whether
a warrant would be required, as it would be if there were criminal
sanctions. Several cases seem to suggest a warrant is not re-
quired in such circumstances. For example, in Portnoy v. Mc-
Namara65 an ordinance authorizing the warrantless inspection
of a bailbondsman's books and records was upheld by the Ore-
gon Court of Appeals because no criminal prosecution was in-
volved. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Real Estate Commission
cases. Although Colonnade involved the use of physical force, while
Biswell involved the absence of knowledgeable consent, the court in
Litvin considered both to be forcible. (In United States v. Ciaccio, 356
F. Supp. 1373 (D. Md. 1972), it was held that a warrant could be ob-
tained for a Colonnade type inspection on a showing less than prob-
able cause; this would permit a forcible entry to inspect rather than
simply a prosecution for refusal of entry. See note 122 infra.)
65. 8 Ore. App. 15, 493 P.2d 63 (1972).
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was held in State Real Estate Commission v. Roberts0 to be
authorized to suspend the license of a broker who refused to
permit a Commission investigator to conduct a warrantless in-
spection of his escrow account.0 7 If these cases are correct,
perhaps a warrant might not be necessary even in a building or
fire inspection program such as that in See if only civil sanc-
tions are available. However, the cases might simply be hold-
ing that sufficient government regulation existed to justify
the imposition of civil sanctions for refusal of a warrantless in-
spection.
3. Noncommercial premises-possible criminal sanction
Here, under Camara, a warrant is always required. Even
if, as in Frank and Camara, no criminal prosecution will ensue
unless the occupant refuses to obey an order to correct a dis-
covered violation, a warrant must be issued.08
66. 441 Pa. 159, 271 A.2d 246 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905
(1971).
67. Because the extent of regulation of the activities involved in
each of these cases is hardly comparable to the regulation of commodi-
ties such as firearms and liquor and the sanctions imposed were severe,
these decisions are subject to question.
68. A substantial number of Minnesota statutes and ordinances au-
thorize inspections which may fall under the Camara rule. For example,
Mi . STAT. § 299F.09 (1971) provides authorization for the state fire
marshall and his representatives and certain local officials to enter on
all premises:
Buildings, Entered Within Reasonable Hours: The fire mar-
shall, his chief assistant, deputies, and subordinates, the chief
of the fire department of each city or village where a fire de-
partment is established, the mayor of a city or village where
no fire department exists, or the clerk of a town in territory
without the limits of a city or village, at all reasonable hours
may enter into all buildings and upon all premises within theirjurisdiction for the purpose of examination.
The fact that the statute does not expressly require a warrant does not
of itself lead to invalidity: "the requirement of a warrant proce-
dure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing
local policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by
force, to inspect." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967).
However, unless a search warrant is obtained, the law cannot be en-
forced in its entirety against unwilling occupants of premises to be in-
spected.
Other Minnesota statutes permit warrantless inspections of private
vehicles which may or may not come under the Camara rule. For in-
stance, MINN. STAT. § 84.51 requires any airplane entering a wilderness
area to report at a checking station. While landed, the aircraft may
be inspected:
Inspection. Every aircraft while landed at a checking station
to report as herein provided shall be subject to inspection
by the commissioner of natural resources or his authorized
[Vol. 58:607
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4. Noncommercial premises-no criminal sanction
a) Welfare home visits
A warrantless visit to the home of a welfare recipient is
permissible under Wyman if it is otherwise reasonable under
the fourth amendment. In Wyman the Court indicated that
not all such visits would be considered reasonable:
Our holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination
of benefits upon refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against
constitutional challenge under all conceivable circumstances.
agents, or by any conservation officer, any of whom may,
without a warrant, examine and search such aircraft for wild
animals illegally taken or possessed or for other things declared
contraband by the laws relating to wild animals, and may seize
and confiscate in the name of the state any such contraband
which may thereupon be found.
Mlum. STAT. § 851 (1971). Although the law is drawn in a suitably
narrow fashion (apparently, no contraband not relating to wild animals
may be the object of the search or seizure), its validity may neverthe-
less be questioned under Camara. It may be argued that the exception
to the warrant requirement for criminal searches of a vehicle, based
on the ease of removal, applies here. However, any vehicle search is
a highly intrusive one, and perhaps the exception should not be carried
over to administrative searches where only the lesser standard of prob-
able cause is required. The section may also be upheld on an implied
consent theory, i.e., that by entering this restricted area, the pilot and
passengers of the plane agreed to the inspection. On balance, it is
highly unlikely that a warrant requirement would be imposed by the
Court because such a requirement would be entirely impracticable for
the aircraft inspections in question and would completely frustrate the
purpose of the search.
A similar provision allows any officer to inspect any vehicle carry-
ing decorative trees:
Decorative Trees... Any ... officer shall have power to in-
spect any such decorative trees when being transported in any
vehicle or other means of conveyance or by common carrier,
and to make such investigation with reference thereto as may
be necessary to determine whether or not the provisions ...
have been complied with, and to stop any vehicle or other
means of conveyance found carrying any such decorative trees
upon any public highways of this state, for the purpose of mak-
ing such inspection and investigation, and to seize and hold sub-ject to the order of the court any such decorative trees found
being cut, removed or transported in violation of any provision
of sections 88.641 to 88.649.
Mum. STAT. § 88.642 (1971). This statute has a built-in search war-
rant provision:
Enforcement. Subdivision 1. Any court or magistrate having
authority to issue warrants in criminal cases may issue a search
warrant, in the manner provided by law for issuing search war-
rants for stolen property, to search for and seize any trees al-
leged upon sufficient grounds to have been affected by or in-
volved in any offense under sections 88.641 to 88.647.
MNm . STAT. § 88.645 (1971). However, no warrants are authorized for
purely routine inspections.
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The early morning mass raid upon homes of welfare recipients
is not unknown.69
It may be inferred from the Wyman opinion that a welfare
visit, to be reasonable, should ordinarily occur during business
hours and with prior notice.70
b) Withholding of government benefit or civil sanction
There has been no clear answer to the questions whether
a government can condition the receipt of some benefit, for
example, municipal services, upon the beneficiary's consent to
warrantless inspections or can impose another civil sanction,
such as a fine, for the failure to permit inspection. Any an-
swer must be extrapolated from the Court's treatment of the
facts in Wyman, for that case involved the unique government
benefit of welfare payments. If Wyman merely establishes a
new exception to the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment for welfare home visits,71 a warrant probably is re-
quired in other situations because the reasoning of Camara
makes the legality of the search hinge not upon the potential
sanction but rather upon the extent of the intrusion. Presum-
ably the inspection of a private home represents an intrusion
sufficient to require a warrant, for absent the special consid-
erations in Wyman a homeowner's reasonable expectation of
privacy is great. However if, as is more likely, Wyman either
removed the warrant requirement completely in cases where
no criminal sanctions are involved or held that the government
could attach reasonable conditions to the benefits it dispenses,
a different conclusion might be reached. If the former is the
correct interpretation, then no warrant is required, and the
validity of a search depends only on its reasonableness. If the
latter interpretation is correct, whether the government may
insist on a warrantless search as a prerequisite to the granting
of benefits should depend not only on the reasonableness of
the search but also on the relationship between the benefits and
the inspection. Under this analysis, since a welfare home visit
is closely related to determining the need for welfare benefits,
it would be permissible for the government to cease the pay-
ments if the visit were refused. However, a municipality
would probably not be permitted to enforce its housing code
69. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
70. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
71. Wyman also held that the visit was not itself a search. 403
U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
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by turning off, or refusing to turn on, the water supply because
consent to a warrantless inspection of the entire premises had
not been given.72
A municipal code provision providing a civil sanction for
failure to permit inspection of noncommercial premises was
upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Harkey v. deWetter.73 War-
rantless inspections of the nondwelling portions of the premises
of animal owners were authorized by the El Paso Code of Or-
dinances. Failure to admit an inspector could result in revoca-
tion or nonissuance of a permit to keep animals and in the im-
poundment of the animals. The court held that such inspec-
tions did not fall under the Camara and See rules and were
reasonable under the fourth amendment. Even if the Harkey
decision was correct in holding that no warrant is required for
searches of noncommercial premises where criminal sanctions
are not threatened, it may be necessary, in a case where the
search is of the dwelling portion of the premises, at least to
give the resident advance notice of the inspection in order for
it to be reasonable.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WAiANT REQuRnmENT
1. Consent
A search which normally requires a warrant may be made
without a warrant if consent is obtained.7 4  The most impor-
72. See Nelson, Building, Health and Housing Code Inspection in
Missouri: A Need for Legislation, 27 J. Mo. BAn 572 (1971), in which
this approach is suggested. Conditioning such benefits on inspection
may be constitutionally suspect; see note 79 infra. However, in John
D. Neumann Properties v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals and
Review, 268 A.2d 605 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970), conditioning a license to
operate a multiple dwelling on inspection was upheld, the court relying
on a theory of implied consent (see note 77 infra).
73. 443 F.2d 828 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
74. If absent consent a search and seizure would be unreasonable,
consent must be obtained from the person whose rights are otherwise
to be invaded or from someone with express authority to act for the
affected person in his absence. Edelman, Search Warrants and Sanita-
tion Inspections-The New Look in Enforcement, 45 DmvIR L.J. 296
(1968). Thus, generally a tenant can give consent to a search for the
part of the premises occupied by him, while the landlord cannot. In
addition, a person having equal rights in a space may consent to a
search in which the evidence will be used against a joint occupant of
the premises. In business regulation inspections the question often
arises whether an employee was acting within the scope of his authority
in consenting to the inspection. See Edelman, supra; Note, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WAms. U.L.Q. 12, 29; Note, The
Law of Administrative Inspections: Are Camara and See Still Alive
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tant issues regarding consent to administrative inspections are,
first, the extent to which a government may successfully claim
that the acceptance of a license to do business constitutes "im-
plied consent" to a warrantless search authorized by the licens-
ing statute and, second, whether consent to an administrative
search, like consent to a traditional criminal search, must be a
"knowledgeable waiver of constitutional rights."
75
a) Implied consent
In the case of regulation of businesses, the justification of
warrantless inspections is often premised upon the theory that
by accepting a license the licensee has consented to those
searches that are part of the statutory scheme. The See Court
recognized this rationale implicitly:
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not
reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private
homes, nor do we question such accepted regulatory techniques
as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operat-
ing a business or marketing a product. Any constitutional chal-
lenge to such programs can only be resolved .. . on a case-
by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard
of reasonableness.70
This statement should not be taken to mean that implied con-
sent via licensing will automatically validate a search which
otherwise would be impermissible under the fourth amend-
ment, because the requirement of such consent as a condition
to granting a license may itself be unreasonable. Rather, the
issuance of a license should ordinarily be considered to give
the governmental body no more authority to search without a
warrant than it would have through any other suitable regu-
latory measure with a warrantless inspection provision. 7 7
and Well?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 313. M mpowsLIs CoDE OF ORDiNANCEs
§ 67.020, note 9 supra, permits housing inspections after consent is ob-
tained from the occupant of the premises.
75. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
76. 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (emphasis added). There is some question
as to whether the Court intended to limit inspection authority in con-
nection with licenses to only inspections prior to licensing. In People
v. White, 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923 (App. Dept. Super.
Ct. L.A. 1968), the court rejected the argument that warrantless in-
spections may no longer be made once a license is granted, stating that
this is when the real need for inspection arises. See also Greenberg, The
Balance of Interests Theory and The Fourth Amendment: A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALaF. L.
Rnv. 1011 (1973).
77. In Kansas v. Dailey, 209 Kan. 707, 498 P.2d 614 (1972), a war-
rantless entry and search by peace officers searching for gambling viola-
tions under the Private Clubs Act was approved as being within the
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Thus, although both Biswefl and Colonnade arose under licens-
ing statutes, their holdings are not dependent on the existence
of a licensing scheme. In a prosecution for violation of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act the federal district court
in United States v. Del Campo Banking Manufacturing Co.78
refused to suppress evidence obtained during inspection of a
bakery, stating:
[D]efendants contend, however, that the Biswell decision is
inapplicable to the present case because the Del Campo busi-
nesses are not federally licensed .... The Biswell decision is
not to be so narrowly construed.. 79
The fact that Congress has not required the Del Campo business
to obtain federal licenses to operate is wholly immaterial. ...
No rational or valid distinction can be drawn for compliance
inspections between a federally licensed business and one so
completely regulated by the act. . .80
rule of Biswell; the statute provided that acceptance of a license was
conclusive consent to immediate entry and inspection. The dissent ar-
gued that such a search was not reasonable:
Were we to hold that in every instance in which a license may
lawfully be required its granting may at the same time be con-
ditional upon a waiver of constitutional rights against unrea-
sonable search, what area could conceivably remain immune
and beyond legislative reach, upon which the constitutional
guaranty might still operate?
Id. at 629.
There are several other cases in which an implied consent rationale
was explicitly used. For example, in State Real Estate Comm'r v. Rob-
erts, 441 Pa. 159, 271 A.2d 246 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971),
the court stated that See was not applicable whenever an individual
voluntarily enters a field which requires licensing by the state and thus
upheld a statute which authorized suspension of the license of a broker
who refused to permit warrantless inspections of his escrow account.
Here, of course, it is questionable whether See would apply in any event
because of the nature of the inspection and the sanctions. See text
accompanying note 66 supra. In People v. White, 259 Cal App. 2d 936,
65 Cal. Rptr. 923 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. L.A. 1968), the conviction of
the defendant for operating a licensed nursing home without a person
on duty during the day was upheld against a challenge to a routine
inspection, the court holding that acceptance of a license was implied
consent to supervision and inspection required by the licensing statute.
Similarly, in John D. Neumann Properties, Inc. v. District of Columbia
Bd. of Appeals and Review, 268 A.2d 605 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970), the pe-
titioner was held to have consented to an inspection of his multiple dwel-
ling structure by his application for a license to operate it as an apart-
ment house. The rationale of implied consent was superfluous in that
case since the See opinion expressly excluded inspections prior to grant-
ing a license (see text accompanying note 24 supra) and since, in any
event, consent to enter the common areas as well as the individual units
granted by the tenants should have been sufficient. See note 74 supra.
78. 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. DeL 1972).
79. Id. at 1376.
80. Id. at 1377.
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The chief advantage of licensing, then, is not that a greater
degree of regulation can be undertaken but rather that an ef-
fective, easily-administered noncriminal sanction is present in
license revocation.81
Although most of the licensing cases which have arisen
under the fourth amendment have involved businesses, the ra-
tionale is not so limited. In Harkey v. deWetter 2 the Fifth
Circuit, in upholding a city ordinance which provided that the
acceptance of a permit to have animals constituted consent to
inspection of all parts of the premises except the part used for
human dwelling, found Camara inapposite because a home was
not involved. The court appeared to interpret the statement
in See approving licensing schemes 3 to mean that any time a
licensing program is involved, no warrant is required as long
as the program is reasonable. So interpreted, the holding of
See could easily be undermined simply by requiring consent to
routine municipal code inspections as a condition to obtaining
either a license to do business or a certificate of occupancy of a
commercial building and then imposing a criminal penalty for
failure to permit inspection. However, the actual decision in
Harkey may not have been inconsistent with the Supreme
Court cases since no criminal penalty was provided by the
city ordinance.
b) Knowledgeable consent
Where warrantless searches for evidence of a crime have
81. A serious problem with the "implied consent" approach is that
it suggests the possibility that an unconstitutional condition may be im-
posed. See, e.g., Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1595 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963). Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wyman, suggested that conditioning re-
ceipt of welfare payments on access to the recipient's house might be
an unconstitutional condition. "[T]he central question is whether the
government by force of its largesse has the power to 'buy up' rights
guaranteed by the Constitution." 400 U.S. 309, 328. He then compared
the Wyman situation to that of a business licensee: "There is
not the slightest hint in See that the Government could condition a
business license on the 'consent' of the licensee to the administrative
searches we held violated the Fourth Amendment." 400 U.S. 309, 331.
Even if Wyman does in effect restore in part the right-privilege distinc-
tion which allowed the government to condition privileges, although not
rights, on waiver of constitutional rights, a license can probably not
be conditioned on an inspection which would, absent the license, be
considered unreasonable under the fourth amendment; thus a license
should be permitted to be conditioned on consent to an inspection like
that in Biswell, but not to an inspection like that in See.
82. 443 F.2d 828 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
83. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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been undertaken, the courts have been reluctant to find a
waiver of fourth amendment rights in a consent given by a
householder, relying either on the citizen's probable lack of
knowledge of his rights or on the inherent coercion resulting
from the appearance of an armed policeman at his door. In
Bumper v. North Carolina4 the Supreme Court stated:
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the
lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden
cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority.85
A series of lower court cases arising since Camara and See in-
dicates that this body of law surrounding consent to criminal
searches will not be automatically applied to administrative
inspections. For example, in United States v. Thriftimarts o
the defendants charged that they had not given an effective
consent to entry by Food and Drug Administration inspectors
since they had not been informed of their right to insist upon
a warrant. The Ninth Circuit held that because of the differ-
ences in purpose and scope between a criminal search and an
administrative inspection, a warrantless inspection of business
premises is reasonable where the occupant has manifested con-
sent and the inspector has not resorted to force or misrepresen-
tation. Thriftimart has been followed by several courts, usu-
ally in the context of inspections under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.8 7 In addition, two New York cases
have held that a citizen need not know his fourth amendment
rights to consent effectively to a warrantless inspection of his
home.8
84. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
85. Id. at 548-49.
86. 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), reh.
denied, 400 U.S. 1002 (1971).
87. United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Alfred AL Lewis Co., 431 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 878 (1970); United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d
608 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970); United States
v. Kendall Co., 324 F. Supp. 628 (D. Mass. 1971). Cf. United States
v. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969), in which the in-
spector asserted that he had authority to inspect without a warrant and
led the defendant to believe that he was subject to prosecution if he
objected. Although the court held defendant's acquiescence not to con-
stitute a valid consent, it stated it was not holding that inspectors were
required to affirmatively advise owners of premises of their right not
to submit to a warrantless inspection.
88. Oilan v. Yee Loy Loong, 69 Misc. 2d 108, 329 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y.
Civil Ct. 1972); Sandflow Realty Corp. v. Diaz, 64 Misc. 2d 625, 315
N.Y.S.2d 487 (1970).
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There are several considerations which suggest that the full
safeguards of the criminal search consent standards are not neces-
sary in administrative inspections. A criminal search, which is
often performed by an armed officer, involves an element of ap-
parent coercion not usually present in an administrative inspec-
tion. While consent is often said to be suspect in a criminal
search, it is expected in an administrative inspection. 9 In addi-
tion, an administrative inspection is less intensive and more lim-
ited in scope than a criminal search because it generally does not
involve sifting through personal effects. The stigma or injury to
reputation that may result from a criminal search is not likely to
occur in the context of an administrative inspection, especially an
area inspection, since the inspection is not personal in nature.90
Notwithstanding these considerations, there are several tenable
arguments that criminal search consent standards should ap-
ply to administrative inspections as well. A knowledgeable
person should not be the only one able to take advantage of his
fourth amendment rights, and it is inconsistent to state that
a warrant is required to protect the citizen and at the same
time not require that the citizen be informed of his right to
demand a warrant.9 1 Moreover, even if knowledgeable con-
sent is technically to be required, obligating inspectors to
give a Miranda-type warning does not ensure that the occu-
pants of the inspected premises do in fact have that knowl-
edge. In the typical criminal search, the citizen is substan-
tially protected by an exclusionary rule; in contrast, those ad-
ministrative inspections which require warrants after Biswefl
do not generally result in prosecution, so that such a rule
would not be effective. The citizen's right to privacy is at
stake, and it is violated whenever an inspection occurs, not
just in the unlikely event that the results of the inspection are
used in a criminal proceeding. Since the occupant is not likely
to object on his own to a failure to give a warning, some in-
spectors might be tempted to risk later invalidation of the in-
spection by not telling the occupant that a warrant would be
required if he did not choose to consent.
89. See United States v. Thriftimart, 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 1002 (1971).
90. La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
91. In United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 849-50 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1969), Judge Wisdom said that under some circumstances "a color-
able argument can be made that certain warnings . . . are necessary
in order to ensure that the waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary
and intelligent" when consent to inspections is given.
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2. Emergency
The Camara Court did not question the long-recognized ex-
ception to the warrant requirement for searches which are re-
quired to take place immediately because of an "emergency" or
a situation of "compelling necessity":
Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of rea-
sonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose
prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has
traditionally upheld in emergency situations.92
Warrantless emergency searches have been validated where al-
legedly unfit poultry was seized, 3 where treasury agents en-
tered on the property of a firearms dealer who had positioned
a cannon near a place by which the President of the United
States would pass9 4 and even where a foul odor emanated
from a student's briefcase left in the school library. 5 The
emergency exception, although perhaps useful in times of pub-
lic danger from, for example, a contaminated food or water
supply, will almost certainly not be expanded much beyond
its presently narrow limits; it will probably remain neces-
sary to show "an imminent and substantial threat to life, health,
or property.196 In the type of administrative inspection which
would normally require a warrant, it would rarely be so
important to take immediate action that a warrantless search
could be justified on the basis of an emergency.9 7
C. THE PROBABLE CAUSE STADAD
The Camara probable cause standard requires only that
reasonable administrative or legislative standards for an area
inspection be satisfied:
92. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
93. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
94. Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
95. People v. Lanthier, 5 Cal. 3d 751, 488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1971). Cf. People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 496 P.2d 1261, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 893 (1972) (necessity not shown when six-year-old left alone in
apartment); Condon v. People, 489 P.2d 1297 (Colo. 1971) (odor of de-
composing body which police thought was coming from basement of
house did not give rise to emergency permitting invasion of home with-
out search warrant).
96. People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 287, 496 P.2d 1261, 1264, 101
Cal. Rptr. 893, 896 (1972).
97. The Minneapolis Code permits housing inspections without con-
sent or a warrant in cases of emergencies, but requires an immediate
report to the City Council whenever such action is taken. The Council
at its next meeting is then required to affirm or overrule the declara-
tion of emergency. MpxLs. CODE or ORui~ cEs § 67.050 (1971).
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program
being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house)
or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily
depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particu-
lar dwelling.8
As pointed out by the dissent in Camara,99 the danger in such
a lessened probable cause requirement is that "synthetic" search
warrants will issue, with the magistrates making no indepen-
dent judicial appraisal of the merits of the inspection. Never-
theless, once the Court committed itself to requiring warrants
for some types of administrative inspections, there was some
justification for a lesser standard. The purpose of an area
housing inspection, for example, is to detect problems before
they become apparent to the public and while they may still
be easily remedied. To require that inspection be delayed un-
til violations are readily observable from the outside-and the
traditional probable cause standard is therefore met-would
perhaps postpone it until a time when it could no longer serve
this function. In contrast, criminal searches generally arise
because of public conduct which makes other methods of detec-
tion possible. 10 In addition, criminal searches are directed
at only a very small segment of the population, so that fulfill-
ing strict requirements for warrants does not make it imprac-
tical to carry out the searches. Since the premise of an area
housing or building inspection is that every structure in the
municipality, or certain parts of it, must be inspected, to re-
quire that warrants be obtained based on the traditional
probable cause standard would probably destroy the program.
Presumably, to show probable cause under the Camara
standard for an area inspection the inspector would have to de-
scribe the agency's standards for inspection (for example,
each structure in a certain area is to be inspected every five
years), allege that those standards are reasonable and provide
any other information available on the condition of the build-
:ing or the general area.' 0 ' The Camara standard would
probably be satisfied in virtually any case where the building
had not been inspected for a long period of time.
The Court has never dealt with the probable cause stand-
ard required for periodic inspections of regulated businesses
98. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
99. Id. at 548.
100. LaFave, supra note 90, at 19.
101. Id. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.123 (Supp. 1973) (Special
Inspection Warrant Forms).
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which are not so pervasively regulated that they fall under
Biswell, if in fact there is such a category. 0 2 It can probably
be assumed, however, that no greater showing would be re-
quired here than in cases of area inspections of buildings. Both
are routine inspections not directed at obtaining evidence for
use in criminal prosecution, and the expectation of privacy of
the occupant of business premises is presumably less than that
of the occupant of a noncommercial building.
Camara left in doubt whether it would be constitutionally
permissible to issue block or area warrants, that is, warrants
which authorize several distinct searches. It now appears from
language in the recent case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States s that such warrants will be upheld by the Court
when the issue is presented. Atmeida-Sanchez involved a war-
rantless search of an automobile by a roving border patrol 25
miles north of the Mexican border. The search was held to vio-
late the fourth amendment by a divided court; however, Jus-
tice Powell in his concurring opinion and the four dissenters
agreed that an area warrant procedure would be permissi-
ble. 0 4 A footnote in the majority opinion stated that the
Justices joining that opinion were divided on the question of
the constitutionality of area search warrants."°5 Although
developing a warrant procedure for roving border inspections is
more difficult than in the case of typical administrative inspec-
tions because automobiles are involved, it seems likely that at
least a majority of the Court would approve area warrants in
other contexts.
Although the revised probable cause standard in Camara
referred only to area inspections, its balancing approach might
result in a lesser standard for some types of complaint inspec-
tions as well. For example, it is possible that fewer facts
would have to be documented to obtain a complaint inspec-
tion warrant than to obtain a warrant for a typical criminal
search. A phone call or note from a neighbor, suitably veri-
fied, would probably be sufficient; even an anonymous phone
call might suffice if other evidence regarding the building or
the activity regulated were gathered. However, the danger that
local officials might harass unpopular individuals, a danger
which is not as imposing when every building in a certain area
102. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
103. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
104. Id. at 283 (Powell, J., concurring), 288 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 270.
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or every business engaged in a certain activity is being in-
spected, suggests that presentation of some evidence of a specific
violation should be required before a complaint inspection war-
rant is issued. In addition, at least where an agency contemplates
particularly intrusive inspections or inspections which involve
lengthy investigations or the possibility of collaboration with law
enforcement officials, 00 a showing of cause more congruent
with that required for traditional criminal searches should be
demanded.
D. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The questions of whether a warrant must be obtained for
a particular type of inspection and what kind of showing is re-
quired prior to the issuance of a valid warrant are not entirely
separable. Inasmuch as the ultimate standard is reasonable-
ness, the burden that a warrant requirement would impose on
the government is a factor to be considered in deciding whether
a warrant is required; and the dimensions of that burden are,
of course, dependent on what must be done in order to obtain a
warrant. An illustration of this proposition may be seen in
the fact that the Camara Court, in requiring a lesser standard
of probable cause to obtain a warrant, relied on the same fac-
tors the Frank Court had considered in deciding that no war-
rant was necessary. 107 Thus before an administrative inspec-
tion the question to be asked is not whether a warrant should
be required but rather whether a warrant based on a certain
standard of probable cause should be required.
1. Traditional Probable Cause Standard
First, one must determine under what circumstances
a warrant based on the traditional standard of probable cause
106. An example of this type of abuse may be found in Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). In that case, the director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an administrative war-
rant for petitioner's arrest based in part on information provided by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such warrants may be issued
without probable cause. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1973). The FBI cooper-
ated with the INS in the execution of the warrant and the INS thor-
oughly searched the petitioner's belongings. Evidence discovered by the
INS as well as evidence found by the FBI after petitioner vacated the
room resulted in a subsequent espionage conviction. The Court held
that the cooperation between the INS and the FBI was in good faith,
so that the evidence seized by the INS was admissible in the criminal
action. See also People v. Terraciano, 39 App. Div. 2d 1005, 333 N.Y.S.
2d 903 (1972).
107. See note 41 supra.
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is necessary prior to an inspection. In making this determina-
tion, a useful distinction lies in the characterization of an in-
spection as "routine" or "nonroutine.'1 08 Generally, any non-
routine inspection-that is, one not part of a systematic pro-
gram of inspection which naturally includes the property in
question-should require a search warrant based on traditional
probable cause. The justifications for applying anything less
than the usual probable cause standard to administrative war-
rants are based on the need for area and periodic inspections.
They simply do not pertain to nonroutine inspections. For ex-
ample, if a building inspector wishes to inspect a warehouse
which is not in the -normal course of inspection, he should be
required to show probable cause to believe a violation exists
in that building in order to obtain a warrant.
Only one exception to the requirement of a warrant based
upon the probable cause standard should be recognized for non-
routine inspections. Warrantless inspections of a very small
category of highly regulated businesses, such as those dealing
in firearms, food, drugs and liquor, should be permissible be-
cause there is in fact little expectation of privacy in the carry-
ing on of such businesses. However, as this exception rests
solely upon the occupant's limited privacy interest, 09  it
should not be expanded to include inspections directed at the
regulation of the activities of businesses which are not totally
and pervasively regulated. In addition, the exception should
not apply to remove the requirement of a warrant for nonrou-
tine inspections of highly regulated businesses where there is
a substantial possibility of a prosecution arising from the in-
spection. A recent case under a federal statute regulating the
distribution of drugs ° emphasized this point. In United
States v. Anile,"' a motion to suppress evidence obtained
during a warrantless inspection of a drug store was granted
because the inspection, prompted by complaints, was not rou-
tine. The court, distinguishing Biswell,"12 held that a war-
rant was required where it was reasonable to expect a trained
investigator to recognize that the possibility of prosecution was
great, stating:
108. See text following note 11 supra.
109. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
110. The inspections were conducted pursuant to Act of July 15,
1965, Pub L. No. 89-74, § 3 (b), 79 Stat. 227, which was repealed in 1970.
111. 352 F. Supp. 14 (N.D.W. Va. 1973).
112. Colonnade was not mentioned in the opinion although there
a nonroutine search was involved.
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The court recognizes that on many occasions it can be success-
fully argued that suspicion does not convert an administrative
investigation into a traditional criminal investigation. The
problem is, of course, one of degree. The prime consideration
must be the protection of recognized basic individual rights, and
these individual rights should not be affected by mere labels.
While recognizing that a high probability of prosecution
compels the requirement of a warrant prior to the inspection
of a highly regulated business, however, the court in Anile sug-
gested the warrant need not be based on traditional probable
cause. 1 4  Although there may be some circumstances where
a warrant based on less than probable cause should be issued
for a nonroutine inspection,."r when an inspection begins to
approximate a traditional criminal investigation a warrant
should never be issued in the absence of traditional probable
cause.
2. Less than Probable Cause Standard
Under the suggested approach, one must also determine
under what circumstances a warrant based on less than prob-
113. 352 F. Supp. at 18.
114. The court noted that under section 880(d) (1) of the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq. (1970), a warrant for an administrative inspection might be
obtained without traditional probable cause, stating:
Perfunctory as it may be under present law, the decision of
an independent judicial officer is still a necessary factor. That
factor is totally missing in this case. Under the facts here, a
search warrant obviously should have been obtained prior to
the agents' first entry upon defendant's place of business.
352 F. Supp. at 18. The court does not seem to require that a warrant
backed by probable cause be obtained when an investigation is nonrou-
tine. See also United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. Pa.
1971).
115. If the court is wrong and no warrant is required for inspections
under the Act even when the inspection is not routine, it probably
would do no harm to issue a warrant based on the lesser standard.
However, in a situation where a warrant is constitutionally required
it should clearly be issued only on the traditional probable cause stand-
ard unless the search is one that is completely routine.
The Act itself defines probable cause as "a valid public interest
in the effective enforcement of this sub-chapter or regulations thereun-
der sufficient to justify administrative inspections . . . in the circum-
stances specified in the application for the warrant." 21 U.S.C. §
880(d) (1) (1970). This language could be interpreted to apply only
to administrative inspections that are routine.
Cf. the standards controlling the use of administrative summons for
prosecutions, set forth in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517
(1971). The basic requirements are that the administrative summons
be issued prior to the recommendation for prosecution and in good faith.
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able cause is necessary prior to an inspection. Such warrants
are clearly required, even where an inspection is routine, for
inspections of homes and code inspections of business prem-
ises; whether they are to be required for regulatory inspec-
tions not directed at highly regulated businesses has not yet
been determined. There are two aspects of the relaxed prob-
able cause standard set forth in Camara and See: the protec-
tion of individual privacy and the control of the unfettered dis-
cretion of inspectors.
a) Protection of individual privacy
With respect to the protection of individual privacy, the
relaxed standard may result in a warrant which provides only
illusory protection to the occupant of the premises to be in-
spected. In See the Court compared a search warrrant for an
administrative inspection to the subpoena required when an ad-
ministrative agency inspects corporate books or records.1 10
Yet, in an administrative subpoena procedure, the subpoenaed
party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the
demand prior to suffering penalties for refusal to reply. This
judicial review would not be available under a typical warrant
procedure.1 1 7 Thus, unless Camara actually requires a re-
fusal of entry before a warrant is sought,llS a citizen might
encounter, without warning, an inspector at the door of his
home presenting a block warrant obtained in an ex parte pro-
ceeding. The resident would not be able to require the inspec-
tor to return at a later, more convenient time without risking
either a forcible entry or prosecution. Since the block warrant
would probably have been obtained on only a minimal showing
that reasonable administrative or legislative standards to con-
duct an area inspection were satisfied, the occupant of the
premises would ordinarily not benefit from the warrant re-
quirement except in the rare situation where harassment by
an inspector was apparent to the issuing magistrate from the
face of the affidavits.
The privacy of the individual being inspected could be bet-
ter preserved by a requirement that, in order for a routine ad-
ministrative inspection to be reasonable under the fourth
amendment, residents of a dwelling be given either prior no-
116. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967).
117. Id. See also K. DAVIs, Ai nqsTRATIVE LAv § 3.06-.07 (3d ed.
1972); LaFave, supra note 90.
118. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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tice of the inspection or one opportunity to refuse admittance
to the inspector. This requirement would allow the occupant
to conceal any embarrassing conditions unrelated to the pur-
pose of the inspection and, to the extent the inspection is
aimed at compliance rather than prosecution, 119 would not
frustrate the object of the inspection. However, to the extent
the inspection is aimed at the regulation of businesses, the re-
quirement would frustrate the often necessary element of sur-
prise.
b) The discretion of the inspector
A second and far more significant aspect of the Camara
decision is the curbing of the unfettered discretion of the in-
spector in the field to make arbitrary searches. 12 0  Routine
inspections which are not unduly intrusive and are based on
public necessity do not violate a citizen's fourth amendment
rights if they are in fact routine. The problem arises in trying
to insure that a "routine" inspection is actually that, rather
than harassment of certain individuals or groups. There are
several ways of ensuring that inspections which are ostensibly
routine are not actually arbitrary or discriminatory. First,
some inspections by their nature present little occasion for
abuse of official authority; the political processes are such that
no highly unreasonable inspection aimed at the community at
large will be tolerated for long. Thus carefully-defined inspec-
tions of every house in a city or every person boarding a
plane are almost certain to be routine. Absent this "political"
check upon the conduct of an inspection, an administrative
agency may be able to develop clear standards for some kinds
of inspections, so that they take place only when certain cri-
teria have been met. (Although it is conceivable that suitably
narrow standards could be drafted in a statute for this purpose,
this is rarely feasible.) Finally, an agency could itself issue a
warrant, enforceable in court. The Camara-See Court chose
yet another method to isolate and control arbitrary searches
during routine inspections where a warrant based on probable
cause would be administratively self-defeating. The warrant
based on the relaxed standard of probable cause was seen as
an accommodation of administrative feasibility and the protec-
119. See text following note 43 supra.
120. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). This point
was also emphasized in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
270 (1973).
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tion of privacy. The Court in Camara stressed that it was not
attempting to reassess the basic agency decision to canvass a
particular area, but rather to ensure that the inspector was op-
erating within the scope of his proper authority. 12 1  To the
extent this is the point of the Camara and See warrants, criti-
cism of their inability to protect the privacy of the individual
whose property is inspected is misplaced. Although eventually
better ways may be found to achieve control of inspectors' dis-
cretion, the Camara and See opinions at least defined that as
a primary goal.
Thus, the chief problem with the relaxed probable cause
standard is not that it results in "paper" warrants for routine
inspections, for these "paper" warrants have their purpose, but
that it may result in the dilution of the probable cause re-
quirement in other inappropriate situations. The suggestion in
United States v. Anile that, although a warrant was required, it
need not have been based on traditional probable cause is an
example of an arguably improper use of the relaxed standard.
The temptation to carry over the Camara and See warrants to
other contexts is great because there are some circumstances in
which they seem both harmless and useful. In the few cases
where a warrant is not required for a nonroutine inspection, for
example, there would seem to be no objection to permitting the
issuance of a warrant based on the relaxed standard. -1 2 2 Similar-
ly, such warrants may be desired for routine searches in some
circumstances even though they are not necessary under Camara
or See. Thus a warrant may seem desirable when, under a statute
with a specific sanction for refusal of entry, such as that in
Colonnade, inspectors anticipate a refusal of entry but think
it important, in the event of such refusal, to inspect rather
than merely to prosecute for refusal of entry. 2 3 Nevertheless, if
warrants are to be issued in such circumstances the courts should
make clear that they may be obtained only on a showing of tradi-
tional probable cause unless the inspection is clearly routine or
the warrant is not required for a valid inspection.
121. 387 U.S. at 532.
122. See United States v. Ciaccio, 356 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Md. 1972),
in which the defendant argued that a warrant issued for an inspection
of a retail liquor dealer was invalid because it was not based on the
usual probable cause standard and that permitting a warrant based on
a lesser standard undercut the defendants opportunity to choose the
lesser crime of entry refusal. The court held that the lesser probable
cause standard was appropriate but that, in any case, traditional prob-
able cause existed.
123. Id.
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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS
IN MINNESOTA
Where as a matter of constitutional law search warrants are
required for routine administrative inspections, present Minne-
sota law provides little guidance as to governing procedures or
even as to whether such warrants may be obtained.
The common law authorized magistrates to issue warrants
for searches for stolen goods. Where the search is not for
stolen goods and the issuance of a warrant is not specifically
authorized by statute, the courts have disagreed as to whether
a warrant may be issued. Several courts have held that a
search under the authority of a warrant not authorized at law
is an unreasonable search and seizure; others, however, have
validated inspections which were made with warrants not au-
thorized by statute.1 2 4  For example, in New York a war-
rant to inspect cattle for brucellosis and a second warrant to
inspect a barn and dairy cows for compliance with sanitation
standards were issued shortly after See and Camara were de-
cided. New York had at the time no statute authorizing the is-
suance of a warrant for these purposes. The court based its
power to issue a warrant on a section in the New York constitu-
tion providing that the New York State supreme court "shall
have general original jurisdiction" and on language in the Ju-
diciary Law giving a court of record power "to devise and
make new process and forms of proceedings necessary to carry
into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it."125
Similar language in the Minnesota statutes served as the basis
for an opinion by the Minnesota Attorney General holding that
124. See, e.g., Owens v. North Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 105, 107, 450 P.2d
784, 785-86 (1969), where the court stated:
The thrust of appellant's principal argument is that the search
warrant was invalid .... The alleged invalidity is based on
appellant's contention that the four grounds for the issuance
of search warrants, as provided in NRS 179.020, in effect at the
time of the search, are exclusionary of any other grounds. ...
In other words, because the search warrant was not specifically
authorized by our state statutes, the search was invalid. Appel-
lant's contention is wholly without merit, because it misses the
point. The question is not whether the search was authorized
by our state law. The question is, rather, whether the search
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
125. Blabey, See and Camara: Their Far-Reaching Effect on State
Regulatory Activities and the Origin of the Civil Warrant in New York,
33 ALB. L. Rsv. 64, 80 (1968).
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issuance of administrative warrants was within the power of
the district and municipal courts.126
The issuance of search warrants in Minnesota is governed
by sections 626.04 to 626.22 of the Minnesota statutes. Section
626.07 describes the grounds on which search warrants may is-
sue, permitting searches for the fruits, instrumentalities and
evidence of crime and for certain contraband:
Grounds for issuance. A search warrant may be issued upon
any of the following grounds:
1) The property or things were stolen or embezzled;
2) The property or things were used as the means of commit-
ting a crime;
3) The possession of the property or things constitutes a crime;
4) The property or things are in the possession of any person
with the intent to use them as a means of committing a
a crime, or the property or things so intended to be used
are in the possession of another to whom they have been
delivered for the purpose of concealing them or preventing
their being discovered;
5) The property or things to be seized consist of any item or
constitute any evidence which tends to show a crime has
been committed, or tends to show that a particular person
has committed a crime.
The property or things described in this section may be taken
pursuant to the warrant from any place, or from any person
in whose possession they may be.127 The other sections set out
procedures for issuance of search warrants. Substantial limita-
tions are placed on the power of the court to issue warrants; for
example, a warrant may be issued only to a peace officer in the
county in which it is to be served and may be served only by that
126. The Minnesota Attorney General ruled shortly after the Ca-
mara and See decisions that statutory authority for the issuance of
search warrants for housing and building code inspections existed by
virtue of the powers granted to the district courts by M.fx. STAT. §
484.03 (1971):
Such courts shall have power to issue writs of injunction, ne
exeat, certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, and
all other writs, processes, and orders necessary to the complete
exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them by law, including
writs for the abatement of a nuisance. Any judge thereof may
order the issuance of such writs, and direct as to their service
and return.
and to the municipal courts by MINN. STAT. § 484.04(2) (1971):
Except as otherwise provided in the municipal court act, each
municipal court possesses the powers and jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court. It may issue all civil and criminal process neces-
sary or proper to enforce and carry out its jurisdiction and
determinations.
Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 59a-9 (July 28, 1967).
127. MXNx. STAr. § 626.07 (1971).
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officer. Clearly, section 626.07 does not contemplate issuance of
administrative search warrants. The central question, then, is
whether the grounds for issuance of warrants in section 626.07
are exclusive, thus limiting the power to issue warrants on other
grounds, or whether the section is descriptive rather than restric-
tive. Even if the section does lay down exclusive grounds for war-
rants for traditional criminal searches, it is unlikely that it was
intended to prohibit the issuance of warrants where no criminal
activity is suspected. 128  Since the section was enacted while
Frank was still authoritative and no warrants were required
for administrative searches, it is probable that the legislature
was simply not addressing this problem. Thus the question of
whether administrative search warrants should be issued by
Minnesota courts should not be decided with reference to only
the language of the statute; other approaches should be pur-
sued.
Initially, issuance of such warrants without express statu-
tory authority may be justified by the consideration that the
purpose of a warrant requirement is to provide an independent
determination by a neutral magistrate of the necessity for a
search, rather than permtting the official in the field to exer-
cise unbridled discretion. This purpose would not be under-
mined by permitting issuance of warrants on grounds other
than those set out in the statute. In addition, the inspection
statutes themselves may be viewed as providing implicit au-
thority for the issuance of such warrants as are required for
their enforcement. This rationale was recently rejected by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Grimmett v. State but might
be persuasive to other courts.129
128. MAnn. Op. Att'y Gen. 59a-9 (July 28, 1967) took this approach,
stating that AD24. STAT. §§ 626.01-.21 "are intended to provide a proce-
dure for the issuance of search warrants in criminal cases and are not de-
vised as a limitation on a common law power and authority of the court."
The opinion noted that prior to the passage of the current statute there
was no specific authority to search for the instrumentality of a crime,
but the authority of the court to issue warrants for this purpose was
never questioned.
129. 251 Ark. 270A, 476 S.W.2d 217 (1972). In Grimmett, a dispens-
ing physician was convicted of failing to maintain a complete and ac-
curate record of drugs on the basis of evidence obtained during a search
of his premises under the authority of a search warrant. Although the
Arkansas search warrant statutes did not expressly authorize searches
for contraband, the Arkansas Drug Abuse Control Act comprehensively
regulated the sale of drugs and included a provision authorizing health
officers to conduct inspections and execute search warrants and arrest
warrants. The court nevertheless reversed the conviction and ordered
[Vol. 58:607
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Assuming that the grounds for issuance of search war-
rants presented in section 626.07 are not exclusive, a further
question arises as to whether the procedural restrictions con-
tained in the other sections of the statute apply to warrants is-
sued on other grounds. Although the statute may not be di-
rected at administrative inspections, the language of the sec-
tions is mandatory and does not limit their scope to searches
authorized under section 626.07. Thus, even if warrants may
be issued on grounds other than those recited in section 626.07,
the need for specific legislation for administrative search war-
rants becomes apparent since the procedures contained in the
present statute are wholly unsuitable for such warrants. For
example, should it become necessary to obtain warrants with
any degree of frequency, it may be an impossible administrative
burden to ensure that a peace officer, defined in the statute as
a "sheriff, deputy sheriff, policeman, or constable," serves the
warrant.130 More significantly, section 626.08 states:
A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause,
supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person, and
particularly describing the property or thing to be seized, and
particularly describing the place to be searched. 13'
Although arguably this section merely incorporates the consti-
tutional requirements for a warrant and could be satisfied by
meeting the lesser probable cause standard of Camara, it is also
possible that it requires "probable cause to believe that a viola-
tion exists," an interpretation which would prevent any effec-
tive area inspection program from being carried out. In addi-
tion, there should be certain restrictions on administrative in-
spections which are not contained in the present statute.' 32 Un-
der the statute, for example, a warrant may be served at any
time during the day, presumably even very early in the morn-
ing, without prior notice to the party whose premises are to be
searched.
the evidence suppressed, holding that in the absence of statutory or
common law authorization of a search warrant for contraband, the prod-
uct of a search conducted pursuant to such a warrant is inadmissible.
Grimmett is not the case of a typical administrative inspection since
the warrant was obtained and served'by a police officer in the process
of a criminal investigation. However, other courts might be equally
unwilling to infer authority for issuance of administrative warrants from
statutes authorizing inspections.
130. Mnul. STAT. § 626.05(2) (1971).
131. MmN. STAT.§ 625.08 (1971).
132. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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Minneapolis has attempted to solve the problem of lack of
statutory authority for issuance of administrative search war-
rants by enacting a city ordinance authorizing warrants for mu-
nicipal inspections. Minneapolis Code of Ordinances section
67.020 provides:
The Director of Inspections, or his designated representatives
may enter, examine and survey at all reasonable times all
dwellings . . . and premises after obtaining consent from the
occupant of the premises. In the event that the occupant of the
premises does not consent to entry ... and if there is probable
cause to believe a violation of the Minneapolis Codes exists in
the premises, then application may be made to the Court for
a search warrant for the purpose of inspecting the prem-
ises .... 1 8
In the absence of action by the legislature, other municipalities
may choose to enact similar ordinances. However, there are
two problems with the Minneapolis ordinance which suggest
that this is not the preferred solution. First, the ordinance pro-
vides no authorization for a strictly area inspection, so that a
warrant evidently cannot be obtained unless a complaint is re-
ceived or violations are apparent from the exterior of the prem-
ises to be searched. Second, it is not clear that even home-rule
municipalities have power to enact such ordinances, especially
in the face of a possibly inconsistent statutory provision.1 "4
Several states have responded to the Camara and See cases
by enacting statutes specifically authorizing the issuance of war-
rants for administrative inspections.' 35 Such a statute is needed
in Minnesota to resolve the uncertainties as to whether and
under what circumstances administrative warrants may be issued.
The following analysis will compare certain provisions of admin-
istrative warrant statutes in other states and suggest the approach
a Minnesota statute might take regarding each issue.
A. ScoPE
The initial question is whether an administrative warrant
statute should obligate inspectors to seek warrants in certain
situations or merely provide a procedure for the issuance of
133. MPLs. CODE OF ORwinANcEs § 67.020 (1972). See also DULUTH
LEGIs. CODE § 29A-3(4) (Supp. 1966); ST. PAUL LEams. CODE § 54.18(6)
(Supp. 1972).
134. See, e.g., Nelson, Building, Health and Housing Code Inspection
in Missouri: A Need for Legislation, 27 J. Mo. BAR 572 (1971).
135. E.g., CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE §§ 1822.50-.57 (West 1972); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 15-27.1 to -27.2 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-29.1-01
to -06 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 45-24.3-14 to -15 (Supp. 1972);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.122-.123 (Supp. 1973).
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warrants when they are constitutionally required. The North
Carolina and North Dakota statutes, which are substantially
similar, authorize inspection warrants where
such a search or inspection is one that is elsewhere authorized
by law ... and is one for which such a warrant is constitution-
ally required.'3 6
The primary advantage of this phraseology is that the statute
will remain current even as new Supreme Court decisions re-
define the inspection warrant requirement. The purpose of
such a statute is clearly to avoid obligating inspectors to obtain
warrants when not absolutely necessary; however, the effect is
also to leave unclear when warrants may be obtained. Another
approach would be to incorporate into the language of the
statute standards regulating the circumstances under which
warrants must be obtained; these standards would either ap-
proximate the constitutional requirements or would require war-
rants in some circumstances in which the Constitution would
not. This is probably not the most desirable solution because the
constitutional requirements are difficult to define and the pro-
tection of the citizen whose premises are to be inspected is bet-
ter provided by requiring prior notice of the inspection rather
than a warrant which will be issued in an ex parte proceeding
and possibly executed without prior notice.'"7 The statute
could also simply authorize the issuance of warrants, so that
they need be obtained only when constitutionally required but
may be obtained whenever administratively desirable. 3 8
An administrative inspection statute need not apply to all in-
spections. The California statute is limited to inspections "au-
thorized by state or local law or regulation relating to building,
fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health or zoning."' 39  It does
not appear to cover most business regulation inspections. The
Wisconsin statute, on the other hand, contains a much more
comprehensive list of inspections to which it applies, including
food, zoning, weights and measures and pollution.4 0 The
North Dakota and North Carolina Statutes permit warrants for
inspections otherwise authorized by law.' 4 ' Although, as dis-
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2 (Supp. 1973); NJD. CENT. CODE §
29-29.1-01 (Supp. 1971).
137. See text following note 118 supra.
138. See, e.g., CAL. Cr. PRo. CODE § 1822.51 (West 1972).
139. CAL. CV. PRO. CODE § 1822.50 (West 1972).
140. Wis. STAT. AwN. § 66.122 (1) (Supp. 1973).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2 (Supp. 1973); NJ). CENT. CODE § 29-
29.1-01 (Supp. 1971).
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cussed earlier, it is unlikely that inspections for violations of
the food and drug laws and other laws covering closely regu-
ulated activities require a warrant,142 there seems to be little
reason not to allow warrants for inspections under these laws.
In addition, there still may be some types of business regulation
inspections for which warrants are constitutionally required. If
so, it is important that the statute authorize the issuance of war-
rants for these inspections as well as for municipal code inspec-
tions. Thus either the Wisconsin or the North Carolina-North
Dakota approach should be adopted.
B. STANDARDS FOR ISSUANCE
Most of the statutes passed to date have incorporated the
probable cause standard enunciated in Camara that reasonable
administrative or legislative standards for conducting an area in-
spection must be satisfied.143  Since the statute should apply to
periodic inspections of regulated businesses as well as to area
inspections, some inclusive language to this effect should be
added to the statement of the standard. In order that the stat-
ute be used for complaint inspections as well as routine inspec-
tions, sufficient cause should also be deemed to be shown when-
ever there is probable cause to believe a violation of a state or
local law exists with regard to the premises or vehicle to be
searched.1 44
C. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REFUSAL OF ENTRY
The Supreme Court suggested in Camara, but not in See,
that consent to entry should be refused before a warrant is
142. See text accompanying notes 47-57 supra.
143. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1822.52 (West 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-27.2(1) (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.1-02(1) (Supp.
1971). The Rhode Island statute simply requires that "probable cause
exists for the inspection." R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-24.3-15 (Supp. 1972).
144. See CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE § 1822.52 (West 1972), which requires
only that
either reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with respect
to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or ve-
hicle, or there is reason to believe that a condition of noncon-
formity exists with respect to the particular place, dwelling,
structure, premises or vehicle.
North Dakota and North Carolina require either that the inspection be
part of a legally authorized program of inspection that naturally in-
cludes the property or that there is probable cause to believe there
is a condition which legally justifies the inspection. N.C. Gm;. STAT.
§ 15-27.2(c) (1) (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.1-02(1) (Supp.
1971).
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sought. A statute requiring that consent be refused before ad-
ministrative warrants can issue would avoid the possibility
of the issuance of blanket warrants covering the entire area to
be inspected. However, this consent refusal requirement must
be qualified so that warrants may be obtained in advance where
surprise is essential to the purpose of the inspection.
California has resolved this problem by providing that "the
affidavit shall contain either a statement that consent to in-
spect has been sought and refused or facts or circumstances rea-
sonably justifying the failure to seek such consent."'145 The Wis-
consin statute provides:
[Slpecial inspection warrants shall be issued for inspection
of personal or real properties which are not public buildings
or for inspection of portions of public buildings which are not
open to the public only upon showing that consent to entry
for inspection purposes has been refused.140
Neither solution is entirely satisfactory. The California provi-
sion gives no guidance as to what will be considered sufficient
reason not to seek consent. Under this provision the adminis-
trative convenience which would result from obtaining at one
time a large number of warrants covering the entire area to be
inspected could arguably serve as the basis for the issuance of
warrants without prior refusal of consent. In contrast, the Wis-
consin statute does not go far enough; surprise inspections may
be required of the nonpublic portions of public buildings or even
of nonpublic buildings. An intermediate approach might pro-
vide, for example, that the affidavit must show either that con-
sent has been refused or that lack of notice is required for effec-
tive enforcement of the statute or code provision authorizing
the inspection.
D. NoTicE
The California statute provides that where prior consent
has been sought and refused notice must be given at least 24
hours before the warrant is executed, unless the judge finds im-
mediate execution to be reasonably necessary. 147 Mailing such
notice to the address in question would probably satisfy this
provision, although this should be spelled out. The objection to
the notice requirement, aside from the slight administrative in-
convenience involved in dispatching the notice, is the resulting
145. CAL. CIrv. PRo. CoDE § 1822.51 (West 1972).
146. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.122 (2) (Supp. 1973).
147. CAL. Civ. PRo. CoDE § 1822.56 (West 1972).
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delay of the inspection. In the case of inspections of dwellings,
the extra privacy afforded the resident and the likely reduction
in hostility toward the inspecting agencies should be well worth
the delay. However, where a business regulation inspection is
involved, the delay might frustrate the purpose of the inspec-
tion. Although California has tied the notice requirement to
the prior refusal of entry, so that presumably surprise was not
considered essential to the inspection before it was attempted,148
the statute as worded renders impossible what would otherwise
be the normal practice: 149 the inspector would seek entry by
consent and, if refused, would immediately obtain and execute a
warrant. Especially if the requirement of prior refusal of con-
sent obtains in most cases, this provision would complicate un-
necessarily the enforcing agency's job. Thus notice should be
required only for the inspection of a dwelling.
E. DURATION
The time allowed for execution of warrants varies from 24
hours in North Dakota'50 and North Carolina'' to 14 days in
California. 152 Twenty-four hours is probably not sufficient be-
cause of the problem an inspector might have in finding a resi-
dent at home. Execution should be permitted only during busi-
ness hours unless the magistrate determines that entry at some
other time is required.
F. FORCIBLE ENmy
The California statute prohibits forcible entry except where
expressly authorized by a judge on the basis of evidence of "a
violation of a state or local law or regulation . . . which, if such
violation existed, would be an immediate threat to health or
safety, or where facts are shown establishing that reasonable
attempts to serve a previous warrant have been unsuccess-
148. The statute requires an affidavit stating either that consent has
been refused or facts and circumstances reasonably justifying the failure
to seek such consent. CAL.. Civ. PRo. CODE § 1822.51 (West 1972). In
cases where consent was withheld, notice that a warrant was issued must
be given 24 hours before it is executed, unless the judge finds immediate
execution to be reasonably necessary. CAL. Civ. Pno. CODE § 1822.56
(West 1972).
149. CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 1822.56 (West 1972).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.1-04 (Supp. 1971).
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2(e) (Supp. 1973).
152. CAL. Civ. PEo. CODE § 1822.55 (West 1972).
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fUl.,,153 This provision is desirable since the normal inspection
is not a matter so urgent as to justify forcible entry. Especially
if a warrant is obtained without notice or prior refusal of con-
sent to inspect and is based on the lesser probable cause stand-
ard of Camara, forcible entry should not be permitted.
G. UsE OF EvmENcE OBTAINED DURmG ADmiNmTRATW INsPEMoN
The general rule for criminal searches is that any evidence
discovered during a valid search is admissible even if it was not
the object of the search.154 However, several of the statutes
provide that where an inspection warrant is constitutionally
required any evidence which was not a legal object of the in-
spection cannot be used in a subsequent proceeding. 55 This
provision is reasonable because it prevents the collaboration
of inspectors and law enforcement officials who desire a search
but lack probable cause. If a lessened probable cause standard
permits access to premises which would otherwise remain
closed to inspection, the fruits of a search based on such a stand-
ard should be used only for the purposes which initially justi-
fied the lesser standard.
H. PRIoR HEARiNG
One of the frequently-voiced objections to Camara's lesser
probable cause standard is that, since the warrant is issued in
an ex parte proceeding, it provides relatively little protection to
the occupant of the premises to be searched. In See the Court
compared the warrant requirement with an administrative sub-
poena. However, a subpoena provides considerably more pro-
tection than a warrant issued on the relaxed probable cause
standard because the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial re-
view prior to suffering penalties for failure to comply. An
innovative approach to this problem would be to develop an ad-
ministrative warrant, akin to the administrative subpoena and
issued by the inspecting agency itself, which would be enforce-
able only by the courts. The person whose privacy would be
violated by the inspection could thus obtain judicial review be-
fore submitting to the inspection without risking sanctions for
refusing entry to the inspector. The primary objection to this
153. CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 1822.56 (West 1972).
154. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
155. N.C. GEN. STiT. § 15-27.2(f) (Supp. 1973); ND. CENT. CODE
§ 29-29.1-05 (Supp. 1971).
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approach would be that frequently-inspected businesses might
routinely go to court and thus avoid inspections except when
they were prepared to be inspected. Whether this objection
is of any great significance depends on the scope of the See
and Biswell cases. If Biswell is given a broad reading, no war-
rant is required in the above situation in any event. If Biswell
is limited to inspections of activities relating to firearms and per-
haps food and drugs, prior review in other cases might im-
pose an unmanageable burden on the inspection system.
V. CONCLUSION
It now appears that warrants are constitutionally required
for administrative searches in only a limited number of circum-
stances; most statutes which are directed at a particular, highly-
regulated business activity probably may be enforced by war-
rantless inspections. However, there is little guidance available
for administrators enforcing statutes and ordinances regulating
activities which do not clearly fall under the Biswell and Colon-
nade rules. The problem is exacerbated by the failure of Min-
nesota search warrant law to detail clearly the circumstances
under which administrative search warrants may be issued. At
least until the constitutional requirements are clarified, it would
be useful for the legislature to make such warrants available to
administrative agencies in all situations, whether or not they
are constitutionally necessary. In addition, some statutes which
regulate activities which may otherwise be subject to warrant-
less inspection may not be sufficiently narrow to come under the
Biswell rule. Either these statutes should be legislatively modi-
fied to narrow their scope, or the administrative agencies charged
with their enforcement should adopt mandatory regulations par-
ticularizing the allowable time, place and scope of the inspections.
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